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ABSTRACT
Title of Dissertation:

Processual SEMOMAP: An application and evaluation
of the accident investigation model in passenger ship
accidents

Degree:

MSc

This dissertation is an exploratory application and evaluation of the SEquential MOdel
of the Maritime Accident Process (SEMOMAP) accident investigation model.
SEMOMAP is uniquely positioned in the academic literature by virtue of its focus on
the accident process. The dissertation aims to reveal insights into why some unfolding
processes help the system to achieve a safe operative state, while others lead to a
mitigated or total loss.
Fifteen publicly available accident investigation reports from Maritime
Administrations and investigating bodies are analysed utilising the SEMOMAP. The
accident investigation reports are coded with the help of two taxonomies – Human
Factors Analysis and Classification Systems (HFACS) and a taxonomy inspired by the
Technique for the Retrospective and Predictive Analysis of Cognitive Errors
(TRACEr). These taxonomies complement the SEMOMAP and provide a
comprehensive perspective to accident investigation.
The fifteen reports selected for analysis are of passenger vessel accidents that have
taken place after the introduction of the International Safety Management (ISM) code
in 1998 presuming the existence of a functional Safety Management System (SMS)
ashore and on-board to ensure compliance with the code, including compliance with
the Standards of Training, Certification and Watch Keeping (STCW).
The accident reports are examined and the analysis helps to evaluate the SEMOMAP
model and its performance. The analysis subjects the model to rigorous analytic
evaluation. The purpose of the dissertation is twofold – on the one hand are the results
of the analysis obtained after applying the model and on the other is the evaluation of
the model itself, highlighting its strengths, weaknesses and unique contribution.
The results are collated and discussed in the penultimate chapter (number 5);
conclusions are drawn and recommendations are made in the final chapter 6. The
dissertation argues that SEMOMAP with its complementary HFACS and TRACEr
inspired taxonomies contributes to an enhanced and comprehensive understanding of
the accident processes. The insights from applying the model make a valuable input
for system resilience.
KEYWORDS: SEMOMAP, Accident investigation models, HFACS, TRACEr, IMO
casualty investigation
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1. INTRODUCTION

This dissertation analyses passenger ship accident investigation reports with the
SEMOMAP model and HFACS and TRACEr inspired taxonomies to explore accident
processes that enable a system to achieve a safe system state and those that lead to a
mitigated, severe or total loss. The opening chapter provides the background and
motivation for the dissertation along with its aim and purpose. The chapter introduces
the research problem under investigation and provides an outline structure of the
dissertation.

1.1 BACKGROUND
State-of-the-art passenger ships appear like floating residential towers and represent a
marvel of scientific advances in technology (for ship fire safety design see, Cooke,
2007). Despite that, even in the 21st-century, we are not immune to serious maritime
accidents that have devastating consequences for life, property and the environment.
The tragic sinking of the Costa Concordia in the beginning of 2012, a 100 years after
the Titanic disaster (see Schröder-Hinrichs et al., 2012) highlights that even in the
modern era of advanced technology, (allegedly) safer systems and international
regulations, severe maritime accidents continue to occur. Even before the wreck of the
Costa Concordia entered the final phase of its salvage operations in July 2014, another
accident of a passenger ferry in April 2014 - Sewol captured international headlines
with over 300 fatalities. Even though Sewol was a domestic ferry and not an
international passenger ship, the accident and the loss of lives is disconcerting.

Passenger ship accidents, that resulted in a total loss (99 ships) account for nearly 6%
of all accidents from 2002 to 2013 (AGCS, 2014, p. 8) and this figure increases to

1

6.38% for 2013 (AGCS, 2014, p. 9). Figure 1 below, depicts the total losses by ship
type for the years covering 2002-2013 and Figure 2 depicts the total losses by ship
type for 2013. The biggest cause of the total loss was identified as foundering,
accounting for 44.5% for the period ranging from 2002-2012 (AGCS, 2014, p. 10).
The percentage for foundering increased to 73.4% for all total losses in 2013 (AGCS,
2014, p. 11) (see figure 3).

Figure 1: Total losses by vessel type 2002-2013

Source: Allianz Global Corporate & Specialty (2014, p. 8)
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Figure 2: Total losses by vessel type from 1 Jan – 31 Dec 2013

Source: Allianz Global Corporate & Specialty (2014, p. 9)

Figure 3: Causes of total losses from 1 Jan – 31 Dec 2013

Source: Allianz Global Corporate & Specialty (2014, p. 11)

Passenger ship accidents and accompanying devastating consequences, particularly for
human life, capture the public imagination and provide impetus to the International
Maritime Organisation (IMO) as a specialised agency of the United Nations (UN) to
regulate maritime safety and related issues with the aim of preventing accidents from
recurring in the future. The 1914 version of the Safety of Life At Sea Convention
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(SOLAS) (IMO, 1974, as amended) was the first version of the convention and a direct
response to the Titanic disaster in 1912 which had resulted in over 1500 fatalities. The
prominent accident of the Herald of Free Enterprise in 1987 with a loss of 193 lives
resulted in the introduction of the ISM code (IMO, 2002). While these come across as
essentially reactive IMO actions to serious accidents (Tarelko, 2012), the organisation
has done significant work in Passenger Ship Safety from 2000 onwards since the
launch of the initiative. The following sub-section (1.1.1) discusses the work of the
IMO in relation to passenger ship safety.

1.1.1 IMO and PASSENGER SHIP SAFETY
The initiative on passenger ship safety was launched in Dec 2000 in MSC 72, at the
turn of the century to evaluate the adequacy of rules and regulations with respect to
large passenger ships as they had been framed before the construction of such ships.
The size of the vessels, along with increase in passenger carrying capacity necessitated
this initiative especially with respect to crew training and emergency situations.
Aspects of the ship, people on board and the environment were to be taken into
consideration by the respective subcommittees. It was agreed that future ship design
should cater to improved survivability as “a ship is its best lifeboat” (IMO, 2000a).
Initially the initiative aimed to address safety of large passenger ships in particular.
However, subsequently it was considered beneficial for the safety of all passenger
ships and accordingly re-titled.

Five pillars have guided the work of the committee in this initiative which are
prevention, improved survivability, regulatory flexibility, operations in areas remote
from SAR facilities and health safety and medical care. A host of amendments were
adopted in MSC 82 in 2006 that included amendments on alternate design, safe areas,
safety centres, fire prevention, detection and alarm systems and evacuation and
abandonment post breach of threshold (IMO, 2006, also see IMO, 2010b).
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Previously regulations stated that passenger safety drills should take place within 24
hours of departure. However, more recently MSC 91 in 2012 agreed to make passenger
safety drills prior to, or immediately upon departure, mandatory (IMO, 2012). The
same has been adopted into SOLAS regulation III/19 (IMO, 2013b, IMO, 1974, as
amended) and are due to enter into force on 1 January 2015. In addition, MSC 92
revised the recommended interim measures for passenger ship companies to enhance
the safety of passenger ships. Among others, the recommendations include suggestions
on lifejackets (placement and availability), emergency instructions to passengers,
musters, securing heavy objects etc. (IMO, 2013c, also see IMO, 1997c).

Despite safety initiatives, passenger ship accidents have continued to take place over
the years. In the aftermath of an accident, the investigation process commences, and
attempts to examine the accident in-depth and study its varied aspects, including the
causes. Learning from accidents is invaluable and the role of the IMO in casualty
investigation follows in sub-section 1.1.2.

1.1.2 IMO and CASUALTY INVESTIGATION
The Code for the Investigation of Marine Casualties and Incidents was adopted in
1997 noting that timely and accurate reports identifying the circumstances and causes
of casualties and incidents contribute to enhancing the safety of passengers, crew and
the environment. The code recognises the need for a standard approach to incident
investigation (Resolution A.849(20), IMO, 1997a). However, no methodology is
provided in the code, but the appendix of resolution A.849 (20) enumerates the
guidelines to assist investigators in the implementation of the code.

Noteworthy is that in 1997, IMO adopted the Human Element vision (Resolution
A.850(20) IMO, 1997b). This is reflected in the Amendments to the Code for the
Investigation of Marine Casualties and Incidents in 1999 (Resolution A.884(21) IMO,
2000b). The amendments provide Guidelines for the Investigation of Human Factors
in marine accidents. Herein, the IMO has made reference to accident causation models
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– the Hybrid model (Liveware, Hardware, Software, Environment: SHEL and Swiss
Cheese) and Generic Error Modelling System (GEMS) of Reason (1990). The SHEL
model is borrowed from the aviation industry (Hawkins, 1987). Accident investigation
models are discussed in depth in the literature review chapter (number 2). More
recently, resolution A.1075(28) (IMO, 2014a) revokes both resolutions A.849(20) and
A.884(21) mentioned above.

The Code of the International Standards and Recommended Practices for a Safety
Investigation into a Marine Casualty or Marine Incident was adopted in MSC 84, 2008
vide Resolution MSC.255(84). The code was made mandatory with inclusion into the
SOLAS convention (chapter XI-1/6) vide Resolution MSC.257(84) and came into
effect in 2010. The main objectives of the code are to provide a common approach for
the conduct of investigations to promote learning and prevent such incidents from
recurring in the future (MSC-MEPC.3/Circ.2, IMO, 2008). Revised Harmonised
Reporting Procedures for reports required under the SOLAS I/21 and XI-1/6 and
MARPOL (Marine Pollution, (IMO, 1973/1978) articles 8 and 12 are given in MSCMEPC.3/Circ.4 (IMO, 2013a).
The IMO sub-committee on Flag State Implementation in its 19th session in Dec 2010
included the study on human and organisational factors by WMU, under the category
of casualty statistics and investigations (IMO, 2010a). The WMU study was based on
a PhD study by Ghirxi (2010), (also see Schröder-Hinrichs et al., 2010). The
committee noted WMU’s findings that the errors committed by operators at the sharp
end were over represented and organisational and supervisory factors were scarcely
identified in the investigation reports. This led to the conlusions that the investigators
either are, not completely aware of the casualty investigation guidelines or have
difficulty in applying them. Some accident investigation reports were found to have
been prematurely terminated which did not allow for supervisory and organisational
factors to be identified. Guidance on the importance of organisational factors and their
identification were absent which could have contributed to the findngs of the study
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which were skewed towards operators at the sharp end. Lack of harmonisation in the
reports across flag states was also identified as reports were of varying levels of detail.
This dissertation focuses on exploring the accident processes and not solely on the
inclusion of human factors, however, this study will reveal findings on identification
of human factors in passenger ship accidents as this study utilises the HFACS
taxonomy, similar to Ghirxi (2010) and Schröder-Hinrichs et al. (2010). A study by
Korolija and Lundberg (2010) has revealed the differing and emergent meanings of
human factors for professional investigators in transport sector in Sweden, including
maritime. This points to the lack of harmonisation in the understanding of the concept
of human factors.

The background of the dissertation has been presented in section 1.1 and the aim,
purpose and motivation for the dissertation is presented in the folowing section (1.2).

1.2 AIM, PURPOSE AND MOTIVATION FOR THE DISSERTATION
The motivation for this dissertation stems from the tragic passenger ship accidents that
continue to take place even in the 21st-century. In line with the aim of Schröder (2004),
this dissertation aims to evaluate accidents to understand and identify why certain
unfolding processes during an accident situation lead to a safe system state while
others lead to a mitigated loss and some tragically result in a total loss involving
fatalities. The purpose of the dissertation is twofold, on the one hand, the project
studies accident investigation reports to analyse the processes in-depth while on the
other, the project is an evaluation of the SEMOMAP model itself. The research
questions identified for the dissertation are provided in the following subsection.

1.2.1 RESEARCH QUESTIONS
In continuation of Schröder (2004), the research aims to study the complex unfolding
of the accident process and will increase the knowledge of accident processes for
specific maritime accident categories (fire, flooding and grounding) and the barriers,
if any, that shaped the path and influenced the accident outcome from a near miss to a
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mitigated loss to a total loss. The research questions addressed in the dissertation are
provided below.
o Is the maritime industry specific SEMOMAP suitable to explore maritime
accidents?
o What is it about the unique unfolding of the accident process on board and
the shipboard behaviours and barriers, if any, that can lead to different
accident outcomes for different accidents.
o What are the common processes in emergency situations on-board in case
of fire, grounding and foundering?
o How much time is available to recover from an emergency situation during
the different phases of the accident?
o How realistic is the time limit of 30 minutes required for abandoning ship,
post breach of threshold.

1.3 STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION
This dissertation is divided into six chapters. The first chapter of the study introduced
the background, aims, objectives and the motivation for the dissertation. The chapter
presented the research problem against the backdrop of IMO’s work on passenger ship
safety as well as casualty investigation. The chapter also presented the research
questions of the dissertation and provided an overview of the structure of the study.
Chapter 2 is the literature review chapter which reviews prevalent accident causation
models, investigation methods and related taxonomies for coding data. This chapter
also makes a comment about the state-of-the-art of maritime accident investigation
methods in particular. This chapter provides a background to the SEMOMAP model
and justifies its need in the accident investigation domain.

Chapter 3 presents the methodology adopted in the dissertation. It presents the
SEMOMAP model in great detail. The chapter also presents the two complementary
taxonomies that support the SEMOMAP model and lend a comprehensive focus to the
model, while at the same time integrating the human factors in accident investigation.
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Chapter 4 is an empirical findings chapter. The chapter clarifies the model and the
taxonomy with the help of a case study example that takes the reader step-by-step
through the application of the SEMOMAP model. The chapter presents the findings
from the analysis of fifteen passenger ship accident investigation reports. Reports are
examined and analysed with the application of the model; data is coded step-by-step
using the taxonomies and the analysis is iterated as required by the accident processes
depicted in the report. The findings for the different categories of maritime accidents
are collated and presented in chapter 4.

Chapter 5 reflects on the dissertation results and SEMOMAP model.

Chapter 6, the final chapter concludes the dissertation, presents the impact of the
findings for IMO, academia, industry and seafarers. The chapter provides the
conclusions of the dissertation and makes appropriate recommendations as required.
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2. ACCIDENT CAUSATION MODELS – A LITERATURE REVIEW1

This chapter presents a state-of-the-art of accident causation models (sequential,
epidemiological, socio-technical and systemic) and analysis methods. This chapter
also refers to the pertinent taxonomies that support accident investigation. This chapter
identifies the gaps in the literature and justifies the need for SEMOMAP in maritime
accident investigation domain.

Shipping is regarded as a high risk industry similar to aviation, nuclear, chemical and
the like. The high-risk nature of the industry and the consequential huge losses make
it imperative that accident investigation is robust to serve its purpose. The need for
accident investigation as a learning opportunity is widely recognised and lessons can
be drawn to prevent recurrences in the future. Accident causation models, investigation
methods and taxonomies are the tools at the disposal of investigators to commence
their analysis in the aftermath of an accident. Accident investigation is also a moral
responsibility of the administrations towards citizens.

15 years prior to the Costa Concordia accident Rasmussen (1997, p.183), in the context
of risk management has asked whether, ‘we actually have adequate models of accident
causation in the present dynamic society?’ He argues for a, ‘model of behaviour
shaping mechanisms in terms of work system constraints, boundaries of acceptable
performance and subjective criteria guiding adaptation to change’ (1997, p.183). The
adequacy and suitability of accident investigation models continues to be open for
academic deliberation.

1

The student has presented a version of the state of the art of accident investigation models in MSEA
252 course assignment on Risk Management.
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Accident causation models for investigating the causes of industrial accidents began
with Heinrich (1931). Accident investigation models, supportive taxonomies, safety,
risk and reliability analyses have evolved over the major part of the century. Today
several models and analysis methods are currently in use (Hollnagel, 1998, Kirwan,
1994, Reason, 1990, Reason, 1997a, Kristiansen, 1995, Hollnagel, 2004, Reason,
2008, Qureshi, 2007). The IMO, in its work promotes the investigation of casualties
and incidents (IMO, 1997a, IMO, 2000b, IMO, 2013a, IMO, 2014a) to promote
learning and stop accidents from recurring. Learning from accidents, contributes to the
‘collective memory’ that has been identified as ‘missing’ by Schröder-Hinrichs (2013).
Organizations in the Maritime domain need to learn from risk (Manuel, 2012) in order
to mitigate it. The following section (2.1) reviews the prominent sequential,
epidemiological and systemic models of accident causation that shape subsequent
investigations.

2.1 SEQUENTIAL, EPIDEMIOLOGICAL AND SYSTEMIC MODELS
This section discusses the three types of accident causation models characterized by
Hollnagel (2004) as sequential, epidemiological and systemic. The section provides an
overview of the models and their suitability to the different kinds of accidents under
investigation.
Models of accident causation, inform the choice of the related methods suitable for
accident investigation and they should complement each other (Katsakiori et al., 2009,
Underwood and Waterson, 2013). In a Maritime context, the investigating body
requires a suitable model for the focus of its investigation. A taxonomy suitable to the
model is chosen/adapted/developed to inform the data gathering methods for analysis
as done by Schröder-Hinrichs, Baldauf & Ghirxi (2011) and Schröder-Hinrichs et al.
(2013). Accident investigation methods are different from accident causation models.
The methods are the tools that help in data gathering in line with the philosophy of the
models. A state of the art of accident investigation methods has been carried out by
several authors (Hollnagel and Speziali, 2008, Sklet, 2004, Katsakiori et al., 2009).
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Accident causation models have been divided into three main groups, 'general models
of the accident process', 'models of human error and unsafe behaviour' and 'models of
human injury mechanics’ (Lehto and Salvendy, 1991). However, this dissertation,
utilizes the characterization by Hollnagel (2004) that addresses accident causation as
a whole and does not differentiate between the models on the basis of human injury,
human error, behaviour and process.

2.1.1 SEQUENTIAL MODELS OF ACCIDENT CAUSATION
Sequential accident causation models are the simplest models that describe the ‘one
after the other’ linear order of the sequence of events. The sequential model is suitable
when there are specific causes of the accident and well-defined links between the
events. The sequential models recognize that the accident can be prevented by
removing any one of the factors in the sequence (Hollnagel, 2004). Two prominent
examples of the sequential models are the Domino theory of Heinrich (1931, Heinrich,
1980) and fault trees.
Figure 4: Heinrich’s Domino Model of Accident Causation
Source: Qureshi (2008, p.11)
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2.1.2 EPIDEMIOLOGICAL MODELS OF ACCIDENT CAUSATION
The term ‘epidemiological’ comes from the bio-medical domain and describes
accident causation like the, ‘spreading of a disease’ (Hollnagel, 2004, p.54).
Epidemiological models acknowledge that accidents have several contributory factors
and take into account the latent conditions (pathogens), barriers, environmental
conditions together with contributory causes of the accident. A prominent example of
the epidemiological model is Reason’s Swiss cheese model (1997b). It is complex
linear in outlook and when the holes align, barriers are breached and accidents occur.

Figure 5: Swiss Cheese Model
Source: Reason (1997)

The Swiss cheese model takes into account the attributing ‘blunt end factors far
removed in space and time’ and the ‘sharp end factors at work here and now’
(Hollnagel, 2004, p.63). The decision-makers, line management, preconditions for
unsafe acts, defences and/or barriers, unsafe acts taken together provide the anatomy
of the accident. Accidents are considered to be preventable by strengthening
defences/barriers.
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2.1.3 SYSTEMIC MODELS OF ACCIDENT CAUSATION
Systemic models address the system as a whole. Accident investigation models have
evolved from identifying single causes to multiple causes of accidents to unforeseen
complex emergent outcomes (Perrow, 1984). Systems need to be understood in their
entirety to maintain the health of the system and prevent accidents. An understanding
of the complex interactions and combinations is required with respect to the mutually
interacting variables. Accident investigation models have evolved from a ‘person
approach’ holding an individual responsible to a ‘system approach’ where the focus
is not on ‘who blundered, but how and by the defences failed’ (Reason, 2000). The
nature and perception of risk has evolved over time. Risk needs to be understood to be
mitigated and understanding risk is difficult in increasingly complex socio-technical
systems (Hollnagel, 2008).
In ‘Normal Accidents’, Perrow (1984) discusses interactions and coupling in a system.
A nuclear power plant is the most complex intractable system with a very tight degree
of coupling. Hollnagel (2008) discusses the suitability of accident causation models
based on the degree of coupling and tractability/manageability. He argues that System
– Theoretical Model of Accidents (STAMP) (Leveson, 2004) and Functional
Resonance Accident Model (FRAM) (Hollnagel, 2004) are suitable for tightly coupled
intractable systems, while Cognitive Reliability and Error Assessment Method
(CREAM) (Hollnagel, 1998) is more suitable for retractable, tightly coupled systems.
Another example of a system model is ACCIMAP (Rasmussen, 1997). Figure 6 on
page 15 depicts the Risk Management Framework of Rasmussen (1997) and Figure 7,
also on page 15 depicts the Interaction/coupling chart of Perrow (1984).
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Figure 6: Risk
Management
Framework

Source: Rasmussen
(1997)

Figure 7:
Interaction /
coupling chart

Source: Perrow
(1984, p.327)
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2.2

EVALUATION

OF

SEQUENTIAL,

EPIDEMIOLOGICAL

AND

SYSTEMIC MODELS: ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES
The simple linear cause-and-effect models fail to depict the complexity of accident
causation and therefore are unsuitable for the purpose of analysing complex accidents.
The Swiss cheese model has been considered suitable to analyze accidents in domains
which are tightly coupled and tractable/manageable as in the case of Maritime
transport (Hollnagel, 2008), which features in the first quadrant of Perrow (1984,
p.327) and is considered less complex than a nuclear power plant. The Swiss cheese
model can provide a comprehensive picture of the accident under several categories of
unsafe acts, conditions, supervision and organizational. Therefore, the epidemiological
model is suitable in analysing complex accidents (Le-Coze, 2013). The aim is not to
state which model is better, but to identify the model which is fit for purpose/suitable
with respect to the accident investigation. The sequential model is simplistic, it cannot
address complexity, multiple actors or multiple factors. The sequential model is
suitable for loosely coupled, tractable simple systems. The sequential model provides
an identification of the active causes of the accident and does not address the
underlying latent contributory factors. Therefore the sequential model does not do
justice to the accident investigation of complex accidents. Neither does the sequential
model identify all the information for the investigator(s) and nor does it promote
learning from the accident to prepare the organization if a similar accident were to
recur in the future
“if Maritime safety is to be sustainably improved, a systemic focus must
be adopted in future accident investigations” (Schroder-Hinrichs and
Hollnagel, 2012, p.1)
Accident models have evolved into systemic that follow a holistic system approach.
This approach considers the fallibility human beings and the focus has shifted from
identifying individual human errors to barriers, safe guards and defences to
understand why they failed (Reason, 2000). A systemic model addresses the
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complexity in critical and complex socio – technical systems made up of regularly
interacting interrelated interdependent components.

2.4 MARITIME SPECIFIC MODELS
Schröder (2004), provides a state of the art regarding the ‘models and approaches used
for maritime casualty analysis’. He finds that some models are generic, while the
others – CASMET, TRIPOD (Reason, 1997a), Loss Causation Model (DNV) focus on
accidents from the organisational perspective. Schröder (2004) expands on the
SEMOMAP model developed by him and the related taxonomy, particularly for the
maritime industry (also see Schroder and Hahne, 2003). The SEMOMAP explores the
accident process and focuses on the question, ‘why some accidents develop into total
losses and while others can be successfully mitigated at a certain level of the accident
processes’. Schröder (2004) presents promising preliminary results for SEMOMAP.
The identified gap in the academic literature is that the maritime industry has hitherto
utilised generic models for analysing accidents in the maritime domain and the
maritime industry specific models in existence presently, have an overtly
organisational focus. In the dissertation, the student aims to work towards the
validation of the SEMOMAP model as it offers a sharp maritime industry specific
focus while addressing Rasmussen’s (1997) question regarding the existence of
adequate models in dynamic society. Maritime accident and investigation is applied in
real-world research. The model is unique as it exclusively focuses on the Maritime
accident investigation domain and is not generic in its outlook. After reviewing the
available models, it can be argued that the maritime industry requires improved
accident investigation models that can better aid accident investigators in analysing
complex accidents. Despite being sequential, SEMOMAP with it two complementary
taxonomies provides a suitable answer in this respect as it is capable of capturing
complexity with a comprehensive focus. SEMOMAP focuses on the accident process
and acknowledges heroic contributions, if any, that helped a system to recover, which
is overlooked by most models as they are reactive in focus. SEMOMAP is a sequential
model, however, it is complex linear in outlook due to its comprehensiveness.
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2.6 TAXONOMY FOR CODING DATA
An accident investigation requires an accident causation model in line with the focus
of inquiry, which encompasses the philosophy of the accident. Furthermore, a
taxonomy related to the model is required for data analysis (Schröder, 2003). Reason
(1997b) had not provided a taxonomy for the accompanying Swiss cheese model. The
HFACS taxonomy specifically developed by Wiegmann and Shappell (2003) in
aviation is in line with the philosophy of the Swiss cheese model. Apart from aviation,
the HFACS has been adapted for use in diverse areas like railroad, mining etc. HFACS
has been adapted for exploring machinery space fires in Schröder-Hinrichs et al.
(2010) and for evaluating the inclusion of maritime human factors in IMO policy
(Schröder-Hinrichs et al., 2013). A detailed overview of the adapted taxonomy for this
dissertation is given in chapter 3 on Methodology. This dissertation also utilizes a
second taxonomy that is inspired by TRACEr (Shorrock and Kirwan, 2002) as the
dissertation looks at the accident processes which involve human-machine interaction
and therefor the HFACS alone is not considered sufficient for this study. The TRACEr
inspired taxonomy helps to evaluate the different accident phases while taking into
account the human-machine interaction. The adapted HFACS taxonomy and the
TRACEr inspired taxonomies are discussed in detail in chapter 3 of the dissertation
and are provided in the accompanying appendices.

2.7 CONCLUSION
As a responsible Maritime Administration, learning from accidents is a crucial aspect
to prevent future recurrences. Accidents such as the Costa Concordia go beyond the
organisation and impact the national, supranational and the international domain
(Schröder-Hinrichs et al., 2012). ‘What-You-Look-For-Is-What-You-Find’ and
‘What-You-Find-Is-What-You-Fix’ are two principles discussed by Hollnagel (2008
cited in Schröder-Hinrichs, Hollnagel & Baldauf, 2012). These two principles show
the limited outcome of traditional accident investigations. Identifying and holding
individuals responsible in complex accidents such as the Costa Concordia, defeats
the very purpose of accident investigations and does not benefit society in the long
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run. The limited viewpoint does not help to learn from the accident and the industry
might witness another similar accident in the future, as in the case of the Costa
Concordia which occurred a century after the Titanic, and the disastrous Sewol ferry
accident which took place in 2014 before the final salvage operation for the Costa
Concordia could be completed.
The efficiency – thoroughness trade – off (ETTO) (Hollnagel, 2009) principle is
faced by the workers in their day-to-day lives and it is the duty of the investigating
body to ensure the practices and the conditions leading to the safety culture on-board
are identified together with their complexity. Reason (2000) argues that the culture
of High Reliability Organizations (HRO) helps to make the system robust and
resilient. High reliability organizations have an enhanced safety culture which is
supported by an effective reporting culture and a just culture (Reason, 1998). The
recurrence of accidents highlights that organizations don’t learn from accidents. An
enhanced safety culture is the need of the Maritime domain which will enhance
resilience and contribute to heroic recoveries at the edge of error (Reason, 2008).

Research on accident causes (for MaRCAT, see Cafferty and Baker, 2006, Caridis,
1999) does not capture the in situ unfolding of the accident process with a focus on
human machine interface (HMI) while at the same time identifying the HFACS factors
that impact on-board human operators and technical subjects as SEMOMAP.

This literature review chapter has discussed the state of the art of accident causation
models and evaluated their suitability for investigating the different domains. The
chapter also discussed maritime specific models and identified that SEMOMAP is the
only model with a maritime focus that enables the study of the unfolding accident
process. The chapter also discussed the need for an appropriate taxonomy to support
data analysis in line with the vision of the model. This chapter has justified the need
for SEMOMAP in maritime investigations. Chapter 3 on research methods utilised for
the dissertation, follows after the review of literature.
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3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This chapter pertains to the research methodology adopted in the study and particularly
to the application of the SEMOMAP accident investigation model with the help of a
case study example.

3.1 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND SAMPLE SELECTION
The research methodology adopted in the study involves the analyses of fifteen
accident investigation reports along the philosophy of the SEMOMAP model. Each
individual report is studied in detail and coded according to the two taxonomies of
HFACs and a taxonomy inspired by TRACEr. The HFACs taxonomy was initially
developed in aviation by Wiegmann and Shappell (2003). HFACS primarily deals with
underlying causal human factors of an accident, while TRACEr, also from aviation
(Shorrock and Kirwan, 2002) takes into account the human machine interface and is
useful for both the retrospective and the predictive analysis of issues in accidents.
HFACs has been adapted for the maritime domain previously in the investigation of
machinery space fires and explosions by Schröder-Hinrichs et al. (2010). This
dissertation takes the application of SEMOMAP further to passenger ship accidents.

The sample selection of the accident investigation reports for the dissertation requires
further enumeration. The fifteen reports selected for the study are of passenger ship
accidents that have taken place from 1998 onwards. The benchmark year of 1998 has
been selected as it was the year of the introduction of the ISM code and in this respect
it would be safe to assume that the ships would have a functional SMS on board to
comply with the regulations. In addition, the training requirements for personnel in
crowd management and control for assisting passengers during emergency situations,
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including for evacuation (IMO, 1997c) as given in the STCW code, Chapter V, would
also be reflected in the sample after the introduction date of January 1999. Table 12
on page 46 lists the sample of fifteen accident investigation reports of passenger ship
accidents analysed in this dissertation.

3.2 SEMOMAP
SEMOMAP was developed during the PhD research study of Schröder (2004).
SEMOMAP poses the question and seeks to answer why some processes in an accident
lead to a recovery of the safe system state while others lead to a mitigated or a total
loss? SEMOMAP is inspired by human recovery and error management. The
philosophy behind SEMOMAP is that the outcome of an incident hinges on a number
of critical processes. Catastrophic events can be averted if these processes are correctly
accomplished at any point, before or after the commencement of the accident timeline.
Depending upon when the incident is averted, the vessel can suffer various degrees of
loss, or even, no loss at all.

SEMOMAP specifically focusses on the accident process, emergency management
and within it, the human operator. SEMOMAP has evolved significantly from 2004
when it was conceptualised. The SEMOMAP model from 2004 is depicted in figure 8
and the current 2014 model is depicted in figure 9. SEMOMAP has evolved
significantly as a model, is sharper in focus and comprehensively embraces the
accident process. The accompanying taxonomy of SEMOMAP has also evolved
significantly and will be discussed subsequently in the chapter.

Previously SEMOMAP sub-divided the accident processes into 6 stages/results;
dangerous situation, beginning accident, near miss, accident, mitigated loss and total
loss (see figure 8). The current model (figure 9) clearly differentiates between the 4
phases of the accident (contributory factors, beginning of the accident, accident and
evacuation) and the 5 results/outcomes of the processes (recovery, mitigated/severe/
total loss with and without casualties).
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Figure 8: SEMOMAP in 2004

Source: Schröder (2003 cited in 2004)
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Figure 9: SEMOMAP in 2014; Source: Schröder-Hinrichs (2014)
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The 4 phases of the current SEMOMAP Model (figure 9) are provided along the top.
They are: phase 0 - contributory factors that led to a dangerous situation on board,
phase 1 - beginning of the accident, phase 2 - accident itself and phase 3 - evacuation.
The results/outcomes are given along the bottom. The five results/outcomes of the
accident process in SEMOMAP are the return to safe operation after taking
appropriate action to mitigate the threat; depending upon the time of threat detection,
analysis and threat mitigation actions, the outcomes can range from a mitigated loss to
a severe loss; the extreme outcome of an accident is total loss of the vessel, with and
without causalities.
3.2.1 SEMOMAP ‘PHASE 0’ – CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS
The 2014 SEMOMAP model regards the first phase of the accident as phase 0, in
which the contributory factors that led to the creation of a dangerous situation on-board
are identified. At this juncture, the adapted HFACS taxonomy is used to help identify
the latent conditions and contributory factors of the accident. This phase occurs prior
to the incident. The evaluation of the issues suggests that if the issues have been
resolved then the incident does not take place and the vessel is considered safe.
However, if the evaluation reveals that the issues have not been resolved then the
accident enters the second phase. The adapted HFACS taxonomy used in the study is
discussed in detail in section 3.3.
3.2.2 SEMOMAP ‘PHASE 1’ – BEGINNING ACCIDENT
The second phase of the SEMOMAP is referred to as phase 1 which looks at the
beginning of the accident. At this stage, the accident is considered to be preventable
by performing suitable and adequate preventive actions that can help to recover from
the incident. Phase 1 commences as there is an imminent risk of incident due to the
unresolved issues from the preceding phase 0. To return to a safe system state,
indicated threat of imminent risk needs to be detected, analysed and appropriate
preventive actions need to be undertaken. If the actions are successful then the system
returns to safe operations and if unsuccessful, then the model evaluates if any further
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measures were tried. If ‘Yes’, the loop iterates back and if, ‘No’, the model evaluates
if there is a risk of other incidents. If ‘Yes’, the loop iterates back and if, ‘No’, the
model enters the third phase of the accident. Incident categories can go together as in
the case of collision and foundering in the Costa Concordia accident. SEMOMAP
allows for studying accident processes as it enables the iteration to explore further
threats to the ship system. SEMOMAP is a sequential model, but its iterative
investigative capacity makes it complex linear in outlook. Phase 1, 2 and 3 of the
accident utilise the taxonomy based on Hollnagel (1998), Kirwan (1994) and TRACEr.
3.2.3 SEMOMAP ‘PHASE 2’ – ACCIDENT
The third phase of the SEMOMAP is the accident phase, in which the incident has
occurred. It is referred to as phase 2. At this stage, the accident could still be contained
to limit losses. Once the incident has occurred at the beginning of phase 2, the system
health indication needs to be detected, analysed and appropriate emergency response
measures need to be taken. If the emergency response measures are successful, the
model helps assess, if the vessel can sail unassisted to port - If ‘Yes’, it is a mitigated
loss and if, ‘No’, it is a severe loss. If emergency response measures are unsuccessful,
then the model evaluates if any further measures were tried. If ‘Yes’, the loop iterates
back and if, ‘No’, the model evaluates if there is a risk of other incidents. If ‘Yes’, the
loop iterates back and if, ‘No’, the model enters the final phase of the accident.
SEMOMAP allows comprehensive iteration to evaluate the existence of other related
threats in phase 1 and 2 of the accident process.
3.2.4 SEMOMAP ‘PHASE 3’ – EVACUATION
The final phase of the accident is phase 3 in which evacuation and related emergency
response is the best option under the circumstances. At this stage casualties to human
life can be limited to zero with appropriate evacuation processes and procedures. In
this phase the evacuation measures are put in place and emergency response actions
continue to fight for time. System health indication in the final accident phase needs
to be detected and analysed. If other measures are tried, the loop iterates back and if
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no further measures are tried and evacuation measures are successful, there is a degree
of loss without casualties. If evacuation measures are not successful, there is a degree
of loss with casualties. The model is comprehensive and allows for analysing complex
accidents. The following sub-section discusses the SEMOMAP taxonomy in detail.

3.3 SEMOMAP TAXONOMY
The SEMOMAP model utilises a very comprehensive taxonomy for data coding and
analysis. The full taxonomy along with the accompanying codes is provided in the
codebook in the appendix.
3.3.1 SEMOMAP TAXONOMY APPLICABLE TO ACCIDENT ‘PHASE 0’
Table 0.1 of the taxonomy is applicable to phase 0 of the accident (see appendix). It is
based on HFACS and suitable for identifying the factors that led to the dangerous
situation on-board. The taxonomy allows for a four level coding for each of the four
identified contributory aspects (unsafe acts, pre-conditions for unsafe acts, supervision
and organisational influence). The operators (human subjects) and equipment
(technical subjects) affected need to be identified and coded first. See table 2 for the 5
contributory aspects and first three levels of coding. The complete taxonomy table with
the fourth level of detail is given in the appendix.

Table 1: Subjects affected by influencing factors (applicable to phase 0)

Subjects
Subjects

Technical

Human

Source: Table 0.1 SEMOMAP Taxonomy Codebook (see appendix)
Captain & Officers

Captain, 1st/Chief; 2nd; 3rd; Other Officer,

Navigators

Helmsman, Pilot

Other crew

AB, Bosun, OS

Engineers

1st/Chief Engineer, 2nd/Other Engineer

Bridge & Deck

Steering equipment, Navigation aids (AIS,
ECDIS, GPS etc.), Communication equipment,
Alarm panels & system
Main / auxiliary engine, engine control panel, fuel
/ ballast water pumps, generators, boilers

Engine room
Ship structure & design

Hull, separators
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Table 2: SEMOMAP Taxonomy ‘phase 0’; factors leading to the dangerous situation;
adapted HFACS
Source: Table 0.1 SEMOMAP Taxonomy Codebook (see appendix)

Resource Management

Organizational climate
Organizational Influences I
Organizational process

Statutory factors
Inadequate supervision

Supervision II

Preconditions III

Unsafe Acts IV

Lack of human resources
Poor technological resources
Poor equipment / facility
resources
Disorganized structure
Inadequate policies
Poor work culture
Poorly designed operations
Inappropriate procedures
Lack of oversight
Poor international / national
standards
Inadequate flag state
implementation
Poor shipborne and shore
supervision

Planned inappropriate
Poor shipborne operations
Operations
Failed to correct known
Shipborne related shortcomings
problems
Supervisory Violations
Shipborne violations
Poor physical environment
Environmental Factors
Poor technical environment
Negative cognitive factors
Crew Condition
Poor physiological state
Poor crew interaction
Personnel Factors
Poor personal readiness
Skill based errors
Errors
Decision and judgment errors
Perceptual Errors
Routine
Violations
Exceptional

A further, fourth level of detail of table 2 is provided in the taxonomy codebook in the
appendix. Table 1 and 2 are part of the phase 0 taxonomy of SEMOMAP and enable
the identification and coding of factors that led to the creation of a dangerous situation
on-board in line with HFACS. A unique aspect in this instance is that SEMOMAP
allows for the identification and coding of the factors against each of the human and
technical subjects individually for an accident, thus leading to a more comprehensive
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evaluation. Figure 10 below depicts the relation between the phase 0 taxonomy
depicted in table 1 and 2.

Figure 10: Relationship between Table 1 and 2 of taxonomy applicable to phase 0
Source: Student, based on taxonomy
Organizational Influences
Human Subjects
Supervision
Preconditions

Technical Subjects

Unsafe Acts

3.3.2 SEMOMAP TAXONOMY APPLICABLE TO ACCIDENT ‘PHASE 1’
It is noteworthy that the taxonomy utilised in accident phase 1, 2 and 3 are inspired by
Hollnagel (1998), Kirwan (1994) and TRACEr. Phase 1 pertains to the beginning of
the accident. Taxonomy tables 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3 are applicable to this phase (see
codebook in appendix) The SEMOMAP taxonomies allow for the identification of
barriers, recovery processes, human-machine interaction and threat mitigation actions
undertaken during the unfolding accident situation. Table 3 (taxonomy table 1.1)
essentially pertains to the risk faced by the system
Table 3: ‘Risk of’ incident; taxonomy table 1.1 Applicable to ‘phase 1’
Source: Table 1.1 SEMOMAP taxonomy codebook (appendix 2)
Navigational Incidents

Onboard Incidents

Entire Vessel Incidents
Personnel Incidents

Collision
Grounding
Contact
Fire
Explosion
Structure Failure
Engine Failure
Loss of Control
Equipment Damage
Capsize/Listing; Flooding/Foundering
Occupational accident
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In the first instance, the threat faced by the system is ascertained. Thereafter taxonomy
table 1.2 is applicable, which is the data table for phase 1 of the accident and is
subdivided into three main categories – navigational incidents, on-board incidents and
entire vessel incidents. Accordingly threat indication has to be detected, analysed and
appropriate preventive action undertaken. Table 1.2 allows for five levels of coding
(see appendix). Taxonomy table 1.2 is graphically depicted in figure 11 below. The
taxonomy (1.2) includes the equipment (objects), persons and actions that were
involved in the phase.
Figure 11: Diagrammatic representation of taxonomy table 1.2 applicable to ‘phase 1’
Source: Student, based on taxonomy
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Taxonomy table 1.3 (see appendix), allows in-depth coding of the human machine
interaction and the accident processes that occurred in the beginning accident phase.
The table allows for five levels of coding and addresses the aspects of threat
indication, threat detection, threat analysis and initial threat prevention action
undertaken in the beginning accident phase. This phase covers how an accident could
have been avoided altogether. The taxonomy of this phase evaluates the functioning
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of specific threat indicator, detector, analyser and action with respect to human and/or
equipment failure. The graphical representation of taxonomy 1.3 is given in figure 12.
Figure 12: Diagrammatic representation of taxonomy table 1.3 applicable to ‘phase 1'
Source: Student, based on taxonomy
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The coding of taxonomy table 1.3, goes deeper and comprises 5 levels. If in level 3,
an aspect is applicable but not successful, then the failure is identified in level 4 and
further elaborated in level 5.
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3.3.3 SEMOMAP TAXONOMY APPLICABLE TO ACCIDENT ‘PHASE 2’
Once the accident enters the second phase, taxonomy tables for the second phase (2.1,
2.2 and 2.3 see appendix) are applicable. In the beginning of phase 2, the accident in
the system is identified and acknowledged utilising a similar taxonomy given in table
3 on page 28. In this phase, the accident has taken place and system health needs to be
ascertained. First the system health needs to be indicated, detected, analysed and
appropriate emergency response needs to be taken. The 2.2 taxonomy includes the
equipment (objects), persons and actions that were involved in the phase.
Figure 13: Diagrammatic representation of taxonomy table 2.2 applicable to ‘phase 2’
Source: Student, based on taxonomy
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Taxonomy table 2.3 pertains to how an accident could have been contained in the face
of danger. Taxonomy table 2.3 is depicted graphically in figure 14. The taxonomy
delves deep to specify the details of human and equipment failure which occurred due
to applicable but unsuccessful outcomes. This taxonomy table answers why certain
aspects were unsuccessful in the context of the accident.
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Figure 14: Diagrammatic representation of taxonomy table 2.3 applicable to ‘phase 2’
Source: Student, based on taxonomy
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3.3.4 SEMOMAP TAXONOMY APPLICABLE TO ACCIDENT ‘PHASE 3’
Once the accident enters phase 3, evacuation is necessary to limit loss of life and
emergency and evacuation procedures get underway. Taxonomy tables 3.2 and 3.3
(see appendix) are applicable in phase 3 of the accident. Taxonomy table 3.2 is
depicted diagrammatically in figure 15 and contains the objects, persons and actions
involved in the final phase. Taxonomy table 3.3 is given in figure 16 and covers how
an accident could have been contained to limit losses in the face of danger. In the
evacuation phase, the crucial aspect is to protect human lives and limit fatalities. In the
final phase of the accident emergency response and evacuation takes precedence over
system health indication, detection and analysis.

32

Figure 15: Diagrammatic representation of taxonomy table 3.2 applicable to ‘phase 3’
Source: Student, based on taxonomy
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Figure 16: Diagrammatic representation of taxonomy table 3.3 applicable to ‘phase 3’
Source: Student, based on taxonomy

Emergency
Response &
Evacuation
Actions

System Health
Indication

Communication
applicable?
Which specific system
health indicator did not
function?

Timing and sequence
applicable?

Specify human failure
Specify equipment
failure

Selection & quality
applicable?

Which specific system
health detector did not
function?

Information recording
applicable?

Specify human failure

Information
transmission applicable?

Specify equipment
failure

Information receiving
applicable?

System Health
Detection

Specify human failure

Which specific system
health analyser did not
function?

Information evaluation
applicable?
Information
transmission applicable?

Specify equipment
failure

Information receiving
applicable?

System Health
Analysis

Specify human failure

Which specific
responsive action did
not work?

Planning applicable?

Decision making
applicable?

33

Specify equipment
failure

In the third and final phase of the accident in SEMOMAP, emergency and evacuation
actions and procedures are well underway and the personnel fight for time.

SEMOMAP reflects the Simple Model of Cognition given by Hollnagel (1998) (see
figure 17) in which the data observed/identified impacts the interpretation, and the
planning/choice of action/execution, though not necessarily in order. SEMOMAP also
draws upon Wickens’ Model of Human Information processing (see figure 18).
Figure 17: SMoC – Simple Model of Cognition
Source: Hollnagel (1998)

Figure 18: Wickens’ Model of Human Information Processing
Source: Liebl et al., 2011
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3.4 CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has discussed the research methodology adopted for the dissertation. The
rationale for the sample selection is also discussed. This chapter has presented the
SEMOMAP model in great detail. The chapter has enumerated the model’s four
comprehensive accident phases (0, 1, 2 and 3) and the results / outcomes of the
maritime incident. The chapter has also discussed in detail the SEMOMAP taxonomy
applicable to each of the phases and the philosophy behind the taxonomy.

In addition to exploring the accident process in great detail, SEMOMAP helps to obtain
quantitative data that allows for the creation of fault trees, event trees, risk
contribution trees and related risk assessment diagrams. The data from the
SEMOMAP analysis can also potentially be used to create improved decision support
systems, which take into account the actions, inaction and time periods to provide
adequate and appropriate support to shipboard personnel (see appendix, SEMOMAP
codebook).

After a discussion of the research methodology in chapter 3, the following chapter
presents the findings of the study.
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4 ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORTS

Chapter 4 presents the findings of the analysis of the accident investigation reports. A
total of fifteen publicly available investigation reports of passenger ship accidents were
analysed utilising the SEMOMAP model and accompanying taxonomies. The list of
accident investigation reports analysed in this dissertation is given in table 12. A more
detailed list including the narratives of the accident is included in the appendix. The
breakdown of the analysed accident investigation reports is given in table 4.

Table 4: Breakdown of accident investigation reports analyzed
Source: Student
Accident Category Fire
Reports analyzed

Grounding Flooding Total

8

6

1

15

The chapter opens with a solved case study example which depicts the step by step
application of the taxonomy to code an accident investigation report in line with the
philosophy of the SEMOMAP model.

4.1 SEMOMAP SOLVED CASE STUDY EXAMPLE
The accident investigation report chosen for the step-by-step application of the
SEMOMAP taxonomy is Monarch of the Seas, a Norwegian flagged ship which
grounded on the Proselyte reef in Great Bay, Philipsburg, St. Maarten, Netherlands in
1998. The result of the incident was major damage to the vessel; there was no loss of
life and minor pollution resulted from the incident. The brief narrative of the accident,
from the investigation report is provided to familiarise the reader with the casualty.
Thereafter, the step-by-step walk-through of the taxonomy application is given.
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Summary
At approximately 0030 hours on the night of 15 December 1998, the passenger vessel
MONARCH OF THE SEAS arrived outside of Great Bay, St. Maarten in order to
evacuate a sick passenger to a shore side medical facility. At 0125 the vessel’s crew
completed the passenger evacuation evolution and the MONARCH OF THE SEAS
departed St. Maarten, taking a South-South-easterly departure route with the intention
of safely passing to the east of the Proselyte reef obstruction. At approximately 0130
hours the MONARCH OF THE SEAS raked the Proselyte Reef at an approximate
speed of about 12 knots without becoming permanently stranded. Almost immediately
emergency and abandon ship signals were sounded and the crew and passengers were
mustered at their abandon ship stations. At 0235 the vessel was intentionally grounded
on a sandbar in Great Bay, St. Maarten. By 0515 hours all 2,557 passengers were
safely evacuated ashore by shore based tender vessels.
4.1.1 MONARCH OF THE SEAS ‘PHASE 0’ ACCIDENT CODING
Phase 0 of an accident deals with factors that led to the creation of a dangerous
situation on board. The involved human and technical subjects are identified and the
HFACS aspects pertaining to them are coded first. In the chosen case study report the
three human subjects identified are the captain, staff captain, second officer and the
one technical subject identified is the navigational aids. The breakdown of the coding
for the human and technical subjects against the organisational influences, supervision,
preconditions and unsafe acts is given in table 5 on the following page. The coding is
done in accordance with the SEMOMAP taxonomy table 0.1 (in line with HFACS)
which is discussed in detail in chapter 3, section 3.3.1 (pp. 26 – 28).

In the coding for this phase the captain appears 37 times followed by the second officer
who is coded 19 times and the staff captain who features 11 times. Navigational aids
as technical subjects have one mention.
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Table 5: Monarch of the Seas ‘phase 0’ HFACS coding
Source: Student

Organizational
Influences

category Sub category L2
L1
Resource
management
Organizational
climate

Sub-sub category L3
Lack of human resources
Disorganized structure
Poor work culture

Total
3
2
3

Poorly designed operations
3
Inappropriate procedures
1
Poor international/
1
national standards
Organizational Influence sub-category total - 13
Inadequate
Poor shipborne and shore
3 M; 2 SC;
6
supervision
supervision
1 2/O
Planned inappropriate Poor shipborne operations 2 M; 2 SC;
6
operations
2 2/O
Failed to correct
Shipborne related
2 M; 1 SC;
4
known problems
shortcomings
1 2/O
Supervisory
Shipborne violations
2 M; 1 SC;
4
violations
1 2/O
Supervision sub-category total - 20
Environmental
Poor technological
2 M; 2 2/O;
5
factors
environment
1 B&D
Crew condition
Negative cognitive factors 4 M; 2 2/O
6
Poor physiological state
3M
3
Personnel factors
Poor crew interaction
3 M; 2 SC;
6
1 2/O
Poor personal readiness
1 M; 1 2/O
2
Preconditions sub-category total - 22
Errors
Skill based errors
4 M; 2 2/O
6
Decision and judgment
1M
1
errors
Violations
Routine
2 M; 2 2/O
4
Exceptional
1 M; 1 2/O
2
Unsafe Acts sub-category total - 13
Coding Total 68
*Subject breakdown legend: M – Master; SC – Staff Captain; 2/O – 2nd Officer; B&D – Bridge
& Deck (technical subject – navigational aids)

Unsafe
Acts

Preconditions

Supervision

Organizational
process
Statutory factors

Subject
breakdown*
1 M; 1 SC;
1 2/O
1 M; 1 SC;
1 M; 1 SC;
1 2/O
2 M; 1 2/O
1M
1M

4.1.2 MONARCH OF THE SEAS ‘PHASE 1’ ACCIDENT CODING
The factors influencing the creation of a dangerous situation on board are identified in
the phase 0 coding. Phase 1 of the accident pertains to beginning of the accident. This
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phase first involves the identification of the threat to the vessel. On board, it requires
that the threat is indicated, detected, analysed and appropriate threat mitigation action,
undertaken. If suitable timely action is taken in this phase, the accident can be avoided
altogether. The coding for this phase is done in line with chapter 3, section 3.3.2 (pp.
28 – 30). In the very first instance, the imminent threat to the vessel is coded, which in
the case of the Monarch of the Seas is the threat of the navigational incident of
grounding.
Table 6: Monarch of the Seas ‘phase 1’ coding (SEMOMAP taxonomy table 1.1)
Source: Student based on taxonomy codebook
Risk of
Navigational incident

Grounding

After the threat to the vessel is identified, taxonomy table 1.2 and 1.3 are applicable
which evaluate the threat indication, detection, analysis, and threat prevention action
with respect to the incident applicable to the vessel. The relevant aspects on board,
ashore and off-board are evaluated with respect to the equipment involved, human
involvement and actions undertaken. If an aspect is applicable and not successful, it is
further evaluated and the human or equipment failure is specified accordingly. In phase
1 of the Monarch of the Seas grounding accident, the vessel disembarked a sick
passenger and contrary to procedure, proceeded east of the reef. The staff captain was
surprised by the master’s choice, however did not say anything.
Table 7: Monarch of the Seas ‘phase 1’ coding (SEMOMAP taxonomy table 1.2, 1.3)
Source: Student based on taxonomy codebook

Threat Analysis
Threat Prevention
Action
Threat Indication

Onboard

First iteration
2nd

Navigational Incident Grounding

Threat Indication
Threat Detection

Human
Staff
Captain

No threat indication
Information
transmission
applicable but failed

Equipment
Sea Charts

No threat analysis
No threat prevention
action
Information recording
applicable but failed
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Human failure – No threat
evaluation transmitted. SC did
not challenge Master’s
decision.

Human failure – No threat
information recorded. OOW
failed to plot position

In the case of the Monarch of the Seas, the threat is not analysed and no threat
mitigation action is undertaken which moves the accident into phase 2. Noteworthy is
that within the same phase, iterations can be carried out based on the number of actions.
4.1.3 MONARCH OF THE SEAS ‘PHASE 2’ ACCIDENT CODING
In phase 2, the accident occurs and losses can be limited by timely and appropriate
action. In phase 2 for the Monarch of the Seas, the first item to be coded is the nature
of the accident that has taken place which is the navigational incident of grounding.
Coding for this phase is carried out according to the phase 2 taxonomy tables discussed
in detail in chapter 3, section 3.3.3 (pp. 31-32).
Table 8: Monarch of the Seas ‘phase 2’ coding (SEMOMAP taxonomy table 2.1)
Source: Student based on taxonomy codebook
Accident
Navigational incident
Grounding

Subsequent to the accident SEMOMAP taxonomy tables 2.2 and 2.3 are applicable.
The system health needs to be indicated, detected, analysed and suitable emergency
response needs to be carried out. For system health indication, detection, analysis and
emergency response action, the aspects that did not function are identified. If an aspect
is applicable but unsuccessful, then the equipment or human failure is specified.
Depending upon the number of emergency actions undertaken in the phase, several
iterations of taxonomy coding can be carried out.

After the grounding with the reef, in phase 2 of the accident, the system health is
regularly evaluated and emergency response measures undertaken. Several emergency
response actions were taken as the vessel faced an added threat of flooding. The
watertight doors were closed, the speed was reduced and the master decided
deliberately to ground the vessel on the sandbank to protect lives. The actions were
successful and the accident entered into the final evacuation phase.
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Table 9: Monarch of the Seas ‘phase 2’ coding
(SEMOMAP taxonomy table 2.2 and 2.3)
Source: Student based on taxonomy codebook
No system health
indication
Recording applicable –
Failed
Transmission applicable
- Failed

Human failure – No info
recorded/ transmitted
Ignore system health –
inadequate risk assessment.
Omitted action – position
not plotted, failed to monitor
Successful

System Health
Detection

Human
OOW

Information receiving,
evaluation &
transmission applicable

System Health
Analysis

Human
SC

Successful

Emergency
Response Action

Action
ECR

System Health
Indication

Human
SC

Information receiving,
planning & decision
applicable
Communication, timing
& sequence and
selection & quality
applicable
Information recording
& transmission
applicable

System Health
Detection

Human
Master

Information receiving,
evaluation &
transmission

Successful

Human
Master

Information receiving,
planning & decision
applicable

Successful

Emergency
Response Action

Action
(Safety
Officer)

Successful

System Health
Indication

Equipment
Water level
indicators

Communication, timing
& sequence and
selection & quality
applicable
Information recording
& transmission
applicable

System Health
Detection

Human
Safety
Officer

Information receiving,
evaluation &
transmission

Successful

System Health
Analysis

Human
Master

Information receiving,
planning & decision
applicable

Successful

Emergency
Response Action

Action
(ECR)

Communication, timing
& sequence and
selection & quality
applicable

Successful

System Health
Analysis

Onboard

First iteration
2nd Iteration
3rd iteration

Navigational Incident - Grounding

System Health
Indication
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Successful

Successful

Successful

4.1.4 MONARCH OF THE SEAS ‘PHASE 3’ ACCIDENT CODING
The Monarch of the Seas entered into the final evacuation phase of the accident after
the deliberate grounding of the vessel by the master. In this phase SEMOMAP
taxonomy tables 3.2 and 3.3 are applicable and are discussed in detail in chapter 3,
section 3.3.4 (pp. 32-34). In this phase emergency response and evacuation come
foremost and system health indication detection and analysis continue as required.
Human, equipment and action components both on-board and ashore are evaluated and
when an aspect is applicable but not successful, then the human or equipment failure
is clearly specified. All crew and passengers are mustered in this step and taken ashore
by shore based tenders. The outcome of the accident is that there is severe damage to
the vessel, however there is no loss of life. After the accident, the timely and suitable
actions of the master, staff captain, officer of the watch, safety officer, chief engineer
and crew helped to recover from an otherwise potentially dangerous situation which
could have resulted in loss of lives (Reason, 2008).
Table 10: Monarch of the Seas ‘phase 3’ coding
(SEMOMAP taxonomy table 3.2 and 3.3)
Source: Student based on taxonomy codebook
Action
Muster Personnel
(Emergency
Team)
Human
OOW
Human
Master
Human
Master
Action
Drop anchor

Communication, timing &
sequence and selection &
quality applicable

Successful

Information recording &
transmission applicable

Successful

Information receiving,
evaluation & transmission
Information receiving, planning
& decision applicable
Communication, timing &
sequence and selection &
quality applicable

Successful

System Health
Indication

Human
OOW

Information recording &
transmission applicable

Successful

System Health
Detection

Human
Master

Information receiving,
evaluation & transmission

Successful

System Health
Analysis

Human
Master

Information receiving, planning
& decision applicable

Successful

System Health
Indication
System Health
Detection
System Health
Analysis
Emergency
Response &
Evacuation Action

Onboard

First iteration
2nd Iteration

Navigational Incident - Grounding

Emergency
Response &
Evacuation Action
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Successful
Successful

3rd iteration
4th iteration
5th iteration

Communication, timing &
sequence and selection &
quality applicable
Information recording &
transmission applicable

Successful

Information receiving,
evaluation & transmission

Successful
Successful

Human
OOW
Human
Master

Information receiving, planning
& decision applicable
Communication, timing &
sequence and selection &
quality applicable
Information recording &
transmission applicable
Information receiving,
evaluation & transmission

Human
Master
Action
Contain hull
damage

Information receiving, planning
& decision applicable
Communication, timing &
sequence and selection &
quality applicable

Successful

Human
OOW
Human
Staff Captain
Human
Master

Information recording &
transmission applicable
Information receiving,
evaluation & transmission
Information receiving, planning
& decision applicable

Successful

Emergency
Response Action

Action
Call SAR services

System Health
Indication
System Health
Detection

Human
OOW
Human
Master

System Health
Analysis
Emergency
Response Action

Human
Master
Action
(local agents)

System Health
Indication
System Health
Detection
System Health
Analysis
Emergency
Response Action
System Health
Indication
System Health
Detection
System Health
Analysis

Successful

Successful
Successful
Successful

Successful

Successful
Successful

The coding is conducted based on the available information in the accident
investigation report by the student. Graphical breakdown and results are shown for
levels 1 to 4a of the taxonomy. Level 4b and 5 have not been analysed graphically, as
they are reliant and dependant on coder reliability, i.e. different people might disagree
with the taxonomy options selected for level 4b and 5; instead, however, levels 4b and
5 are described and discussed very broadly and subjectively.

An indicative fault tree diagram is created for the Monarch of the Seas, by the student
and is presented on the following page. The diagram reflects the data that can be
generated by the SEMOMAP model and accompanying taxonomy. SEMOMAP
generates a more comprehensive output than the fault tree analysis as it is supported
by two strong accompanying taxonomies.
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Figure 19: FTA Monarch of the Seas
Source: Student
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Poor training

4.2 DISSERTATION RESULTS
The step-by-step coding of the sample case study of the Monarch of the Seas in section
4.1 is followed by the results of the dissertation. As previously mentioned, this
dissertation contains the analysis of 15 publicly available accident investigation
reports, of which 8 on fire, 6 on grounding and 1 on flooding. 14 of the 15 investigated
reports pertained exclusively to their accident category in question, while Monarch of
the Seas discussed in 4.1 above was the only one that faced an additional threat of
flooding after grounding with the reef. To mitigate the threat of flooding and protect
lives it was decided to deliberately ground the vessel on the sandbank.

The breakdown of the accident outcomes is given below in table 11

Table 11: Accident outcomes of analysed passenger ship investigation reports
Source: Compiled by Student

Fire
7 Mitigated loss 1 Severe loss
8

Grounding
4 Mitigated loss 2 Severe loss
6

Flooding
1 Near miss
1

None of the passenger ship accidents analysed, resulted in a total loss; no lives were
lost in these accidents. Table 12 on the following page presents a list of the accident
investigation reports analysed in the study together with the online sources for the
reports. This section (4.2) first presents category wise findings specific to Fire,
grounding and flooding before moving onto overall findings which encompass all the
three categories.

SEMOMAP allows for the study of actions and processes in the accident context and
helps identify human contribution, involved equipment and actions that contributed to
the accident outcomes. Further on in the chapter the findings are collated and presented
and a separate section is dedicated to the evaluation of the SEMOMAP model itself.
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Table 12: List of accident investigation reports analyzed
Source: Student
No.

Ship Name

1

M.V. Zenith

8918136

IMO No

Flag

2

M.V. Azamara Quest

9210218

Malta

Classification
Germanischer
Lloyds
Lloyds’ Register

3

M.V. Carnival Spirit

9188647

Malta

Lloyds’ Register

Fire

9333163

Panama

Lloyds’ Register

Fire

9241061

United
Kingdom
Bermuda
Bermuda

Lloyds’ Register

Fire

NA
RINA

Fire
Fire

Malta

Nature of accident

Fire
Fire

4

M.V. Carnival
Splendor

5

RMS Queen Mary 2

6

M.V. Royal Princess

7

M.V. Star Princess

9210220
9192363

8

M.V. The Calypso

NA

Cyprus

Lloyds’ Register

Fire

9

M.V. Saga Sapphire

7822457

Malta

Flooding

10

M.V. Lauren L

9246827

Malta

11

M.V. Clipper
Adventure

NA

Bahamas

Germanischer
Lloyds
Germanischer
Lloyds
NA

12

M.V. Deutschland

9141807

Germany

Grounding

13

M.V. Van Gogh

7359400

14

M.V. Astor

8506373

Marshall
Island
Bahamas

Germanischer
Lloyds
Det Norske Veritas

Grounding

15

M.V. Monarch of the
Seas

8819500

Norway

Germanischer
Lloyds
Det Norske Veritas
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Grounding
Grounding

Grounding

Grounding

Report Source
https://mti.gov.mt/en/Pages/MSIU/Safety-Investigations2014.aspx
https://mti.gov.mt/en/Pages/MSIU/Safety-Investigations2012.aspx
https://mti.gov.mt/en/Pages/MSIU/Safety-Investigations2012.aspx
https://homeport.uscg.mil/mycg/portal/ep/contentView.do?chann
elId=18374&contentId=460088&programId=21431&programPage=
%2Fep%2Fprogram%2Feditorial.jsp&pageTypeId=13489&cont
entType=EDITORIAL
http://www.maib.gov.uk/cms_resources.cfm?file=/QM2Report.p
df
http://www.bermudashipping.bm
http://www.maib.gov.uk/cms_resources.cfm?file=/star%20prince
ss.pdf
http://www.maib.gov.uk/publications/investigation_reports/2007
/calypso.cfm?view=print&
https://mti.gov.mt/en/Pages/MSIU/Safety-Investigations2014.aspx
https://mti.gov.mt/en/Pages/MSIU/Safety-Investigations2013.aspx
http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapportsreports/marine/2010/m10h0006/m10h0006.asp
http://www.bsu-bund.de
http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2008/
mair/pdf/mair252_001.pdf
http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2004/
mair/mair200.aspx
http://marinecasualty.com/documents/monarch.pdf

4.2.1 FLOODING CATEGORY OVERVIEW
This section discusses the findings from the flooding accident category, of which only
one report was coded. Table 13, shows the ‘phase 0’ HFACS coding for the flooding
accident that led to the creation of a dangerous situation on-board.
Table 13: Flooding accident category ‘phase 0’ HFACS overview
Source: Student based on taxonomy codebook

Unsafe Acts

Preconditions

Supervision

Organizational Influences

Sub-Category L2
Resource Management
Organizational Climate

Organizational Process

Inadequate Supervision
Planned inappropriate
operations
Supervisory Violations

Sub-Sub Category*
L3
Lack of human
resources
Disorganized
structure
Poor work culture
Poorly designed
operations
Inadequate
procedures
Lack of oversight
Poor shipborne and
shore supervision
Poor shipborne
operations
Shipborne violations

Operator
breakdown
1C

Total

1C

1

1C
1C

1
1

1C

1

1C

1
Category total: 6
2C
2
1 C; 1 OO;
1 OE
2 C; 1 OO

3
3

Category total: 8
2

Environmental Factors

Poor technological
environment

2C

Crew Condition

Negative cognitive
factors

1 C; 1 OO;
1 OE

Errors

Skill based errors
Decision and
judgment errors
Routine

Violations

1

3

Category total: 5
1 C; 1 OO
2
1C
1
1C; 1 OO

2

Category total: 5
Coding Total 24

*Operator: C – Captain; OO – Other Officer; OE – Other Engineer
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Figure 20: Flooding ‘phase 0’ operator overview
Source: Student
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Other
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Table 13 on the preceding page depicts the flooding category overview for HFACS
coding and figure 20, offers the operator breakdown for each category. The Captain in
figure 20 appears under all HFACS categories and occupies a large share of each
category, as can be expected given his overall role on-board. The other operators that
feature are the Other Officer (exact rank not given in report, but the Officer of the
Watch) and Other Engineer (most probably the Engine Officer on duty). This finding
also points to the level of detail included in accident investigation reports regarding
operators involved.

The background to the creation of a dangerous situation on-board included the poor
operational practice of utilising the Officer of the Watch for the purpose of ballast
operations, which was further compounded by a poor hand/take over, thereby
compromising safety. There was inadequate monitoring from both the deck and the
engine department. Inadequate SMS guidelines for the operation and inadequate risk
assessment, led to the dangerous situation of flooding, and the move into phase 1.
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4.2.1.1 FLOODING ‘PHASE 1’ OVERVIEW
The flooding had begun, however the accident had not taken place per se and the threat
indication, detection, analysis and prevention were successfully carried out.
Table 14: Flooding accident category ‘phase 1’ overview (level L2B)
Source: Student based on taxonomy codebook
L2B
On-board Human Other
L2B
On-board Human OOW
L2B
On-board Human OOW
L2B
On-board Action Other

Threat Indication
2
Threat Detection
3
Threat Analysis
3
Threat Prevention Action
3

Figure 21: Flooding ‘phase 1’ overview (L3-4)
Source: Student

Legend

Applicable and Successful
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In phase one of the flooding accident, the on-board human was applicable 11 times
and all 11 times was successful. The good practice of on-board safety rounds helped
the accident to be averted in a timely manner. The vigilant crew during the safety
round, immediately reported the finding of water build up. The cause of the flooding
was investigated, ballast operations were stopped and corrective actions taken, which
prevented the flooding incident from progressing into phase two of the accident.

4.2.2 GROUNDING CATEGORY OVERVIEW
This sub-section presents the findings of the grounding category of accidents of which
6 accidents were analysed using SEMOMAP, of which 5 were a mitigated loss and 1
a severe loss. The HFACS coding for the grounding category for human operators and
equipments is provided on the following pages.

Most grounding accidents appear to have taken place due to poor communication,
Bridge Resource Management and Bridge Team Management practices on-board.
Inadequate risk assessment, passage planning, navigation chart correction and position
monitoring are some of the aspects that feature in the reports as well as the lack of
involvement of the personnel on the bridge at the time of the incident (the concerned
OOW or the pilot, Staff Captain etc.). For instance, a language barrier was identified
in Astor and Van Gogh grounding in Australia during departure operations as the crew
on-board were communicating in Russian and Ukrainian whereas the pilot was able to
understand only English and this was a complete failure of BTM and BRM.
4.2.2.1 GROUNDING CATEGORY ‘PHASE 0’ OVERVIEW
Table 15 on the following page depicts the coding for the human operators involved
in the Grounding category according to HFACS and Table 16 presents the technical
subjects/equipment involved in the grounding accident category.
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Table 15: Grounding accident category ‘phase 0’ HFACS operator overview; Source: Student, according to taxonomy

Unsafe
Acts (iv)

Preconditions (iii)

Supervision
(ii)

Organisational Influences (i)

L1

Operator Breakdown

Sub-Category L2

Sub-Sub-Category L3

Resource Management

Lack of Human Resources
Poor Technological Resources
Disorganised Structure

Organisational Climate

Inadequate Policies
Poor Work Culture
Poorly Designed Operations
Inappropriate Procedures
Poor International/National Standards

Statutory Factors
Inadequate Supervision
Planned Inappropriate Operations
Failed to Correct Known Problems

Inadequate Flag State Implementation
Poor Shipborne and Shore Supervision
Poor Shipborne Operations
Shipborne Related Shortcomings

Supervisory Violations

Shipborne Violations
Poor Physical Environment

Environmental Factors
Crew Condition
Personnel Factors
Errors
Violations

Poor Technological Environment
Negative Cognitive Factors
Poor Physiological State
Poor Crew Interaction
Poor Personal Readiness
Skill-based errors
Decision and judgement errors
Routine
Exceptional

Operator: C-Captain; CO-Chief Officer; 20-2nd Officer; OO; Other Officer Total
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C

CO

2O

OO Helmsman Pilot Total
1
0
1
13
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
1
3
1
3
22

6
2
1
1
8

4
0
1
0
5

1
0
0
0
2

8
6
3
1

0
0
0
0

1
0
0
0

0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0

9
6
3
1

8
13
8
11

3
7
4
4

2
3
2
2

2
2
0
2

0
0
0
0

0
3
2
0

15
28
16
19

1
3

0
0

0
3

0
1

0
0

0
1

1
8

10
3
6
8
16
10
13
4
150

2
0
4
3
3
1
5
1
47

3
0
1
1
2
1
4
1
29

4
0
1
1
3
0
3
0
23

0
0
2
2
1
0
1
0
7

1
0
2
0
3
0
1
1
18

20
3
16
15
28
12
27
7
274

Table 16: Grounding accident category ‘phase 0’ HFACS equipment overview; Source: Student, according to taxonomy
Sub-Category L2

Preconditions

Supervision

Organisational Influences

L1

Resource
Management

Organisational Climate

Equipment Breakdown
Steering
Navigation Aids (AIS,
Equipment ECDIS, Radar, GPS, etc.)
0
1

Sub-Sub-Category L3
Poor Technological Resources
Poor Equipment/Facility Resources
Disorganised Structure
Inadequate Policies
Poor Work Culture
Poorly Designed Operations

Organisational Process
Planned Inappropriate
Operations
Supervisory Violations

Inappropriate Procedures

Other
2

Total
3

1

0

0

1

1

0

0

1

0
0
0

0
1
0

1
2
1

1
3
1

0

0

2

2

1

0

0

1

1

0

0

1

1
1
0

0
1
0

1
2
1

2
4
1

6

3

12

21

Poor Shipborne Operations

Environmental Factors

Shipborne Violations
Poor Physical Environment
Poor Technological Environment

Crew Condition

Negative Cognitive Factors
Total

52

Figure 22: Grounding ‘phase 0’ operator overview
Source: Student

Figure 23: Grounding ‘phase 0’ HFACS equipment overview
Source: Student

In ‘phase 0’ of the grounding accident category, HFACS categories are attributed
highest to the Captain, followed by the Chief Officer and 2nd Officer. The HFACS
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categories are largely attributable to the following equipment – steering equipment,
navigation aids (AIS, ECDIS, Radar, GPS etc.) among others. The taxonomy can
further be expanded to include these in the future.
4.2.2.2 GROUNDING CATEGORY ‘PHASE 1’ OVERVIEW
The dangerous on board situation contributes to, and leads to the beginning of accident
‘phase 1’. In case of a grounding accident, threat indication is attributable to equipment
like ECDIS, Echo Sounder, Radar, Sea charts among others. Threat is detected by the
human operators – master and others, which includes individuals like the Staff Captain
and Pilot. The taxonomy can be expanded to include these personnel for future coding
of accidents. Threat analysis is largely carried out by the master and prevention actions
include altering speed and manoeuvring.
Figure 24: Grounding ‘phase 1’ overview (L1-2)
Source: Student based on taxonomy
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‘Others’ in ‘threat indication’ refers to Staff captain (2 times) and Pilot (4 times).
‘Others’ in ‘detection’ refers to the Staff captain (6 times) and Pilot (6 times). 73% of
the times, threat prevention actions are not taken, which moves the accident into the
next phase of the accident. Levels 3-4 of the SEMOMAP depict the applicability and
success of threat indication, detection, analysis and threat prevention action.
Figure 25: Grounding ‘phase 1’ overview (L3-4)
Source: Student, based on taxonomy
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A threat not detected and analysed in time, does not have a corresponding mitigation
action but the threat of an incident does not diminish. This level helps to study the
applicable aspect and whether it was successful or not. Applicable aspects were
successful 29 times and unsuccessful 31 times.
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Level 4-5 of SEMOMAP taxonomy specifies human or equipment failure. Figure 26,
depicts Level 4-5. This depicts the further breakdown of the ‘orange’ legend –
‘applicable & unsuccessful’ of figure 25.
Figure 26: Grounding ‘phase 1’ overview (L4-5); Source: Student based on taxonomy
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Human failure specify

There is no equipment failure in phase 1 (L4-5), human failure has been noted in all
31 instances at this level. The situation further exacerbates and moves into ‘Phase 2’.
4.2.2.3 GROUNDING CATEGORY ‘PHASE 2’ OVERVIEW
The accident takes place in this phase and the threat indication changes into the
indication of system health, after the accident.
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Figure 27: Grounding ‘phase 2’ overview (L1-2)
Source: Student, based on taxonomy
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System health is indicated by the equipment such as the water level indicators and
crew members such as the OOW. System health is detected largely by the Master and
the OOW. System health analysis is largely carried out by the Master and emergency
response actions include off board action by shore based tenders to evacuate
passengers, doing the reverse thrust and deliberately grounding the vessel (Monarch
of the Seas) among other actions.
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Figure 28: Grounding ‘phase 2’ overview (L3-4)
Source: Student, based on taxonomy
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Level L3-4 of phase two of the taxonomy helps identify which aspects of system health
indication, detection, analysis and emergency action were applicable and whether they
succeeded or not. In phase two of the grounding accident, at this level, there have been
instances in system health indication, analysis and emergency response action where
there have been failures. Aspects were applicable and successful 170 times and
applicable but unsuccessful 30 times.
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Figure 29: Grounding ‘phase 2’ overview (L4-5)
Source: Student, based on taxonomy
System Health Indication
1.2
1
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0

1

System Health Analysis
6.2
6
5.8
5.6
5.4
5.2
5
4.8
4.6
4.4

1

Information
Recording
Applicable?

Information
Transmission
Applicable?

6
5
Information Planning
Decision
Receiving Applicable? Applicable?
Applicable?

Emergency Response Action
10
8
6
4
2

7

8

Timing &
Sequence
Applicable?

Selection &
Quality
Applicable?

2

0

Communication
Applicable?

Legend

Human failure specify

In level 4-5 of phase 2 taxonomy, the failure can be attributable to the human or
equipment and in each of the 30 cases of failure specification in grounding, it pertained
to the human operator as depicted in figure 29 above. An accident moves into the final
evacuation phase to protect lives and grounding is the only accident category that has
led to evacuations. Accident categories of fire and flooding have not entered this phase.
4.2.2.4 GROUNDING CATEGORY ‘PHASE 3’ OVERVIEW
The final ‘phase 3’ pertains to evacuation in an accident situation. In phase 1 and 2
system health is required to be evaluated to initiate appropriate emergency actions.
However, in phase 3, emergency response and actions take precedence over the
evaluation of system health
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Figure 30: Grounding ‘phase 3’ overview (L1-2)
Source: Student, based on taxonomy
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In an emergency situation arising out of grounding, several measures can be initiated
like mustering personnel, calling SAR services, tugs, attempting to contain hull
damage, dropping anchor etc. System health is usually indicated by the personnel on
the scene like the OOW. It is brought to the attention of senior personnel, the Master
and in all the grounding cases system analysis is carried out by the Master.

In levels 3-4 of phase 3 taxonomy, aspects are checked for their applicability and
success.
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Figure 31: Grounding ‘phase 3’ overview (L3-4)
Source: Student, based on taxonomy
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In level 3-4 of phase 3 taxonomy in grounding, in each of the 77 times, the applicable
aspect has been successful, pointing towards success in post-accident observable
aspects and actions. As no aspect has been applicable and unsuccessful, the coding
stops at this point. At this stage, no equipment or human failure is noted and phase 3
of grounding accidents have led to successful evacuations with no loss of lives.

4.2.3 FIRE CATEGORY OVERVIEW
In this sub-section the findings related to the fire accident category are presented. A
total of 8 accident investigation reports were coded under this category, of which 7
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resulted in a mitigated loss and 1 resulted in a severe loss of the vessel. None of the
fire accidents entered phase 3 – evacuation phase of the accident. Major accidents in
this category are due to engine room fires, especially auxiliary engine or main engine
fires. Most of the fires were caused by fuel oil leaks due to loose connections or
equipment failure. Personnel immediately concerned with fire accidents were the
OOW and the engineer officer on duty and motorman, among others. The accidents
have largely occurred due to a failure to comply with standard good engineering
practice and a failure to comply with equipment/manufacturer’s guidelines.
4.2.3.1 FIRE CATEGORY ‘PHASE 0’ OVERVIEW
The HFACS coding for both human operators and equipment (tables 17 and 18) is
provided on pages 64 and 65 for this category.
Figure 32: Fire ‘phase 0’ HFACS operator overview; Source: Student
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Figure 33: Fire ‘phase 0’ HFACS equipment overview; Source: Student
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Figures 32 and 33 above, depict the HFACS categories for operators and equipment
respectively. Noteworthy in figure 32 is that the HFACS categories of ‘organisational
influences’ and ‘supervision’ impact the captain most, however in ‘preconditions’, the
captain is preceded by the chief engineer, who is in-charge of the engine room. Under
‘unsafe acts’, the captain and chief engineer are equally identified.

The auxiliary engines and the main engine are critical equipment and they are impacted
along with fuel pumps by the HFACS categories of ‘supervision’, ‘organisational
influences’ and ‘preconditions’.
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Supervision (ii)

Organisational Influences (i)

Table 17: Fire accident category ‘phase 0’ HFACS operator overview; Source: Student according to taxonomy
Operator Break Down
L1
Sub-Category L2
Sub-Sub-Category L3
C CO 2O OO AB OS CE
2E
OE Total
4
1
1
4
2
1
5
4
4
26
Lack of Human Resources
Resource
Poor Equipment/Facility
2
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
3
Management
Resources
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
Disorganised Structure
2
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
3
Inadequate Policies
Organisational
9
2
2
4
2
1
4
3
4
31
Climate
Poor Work Culture
4
0
0
2
0
0
2
0
1
9
Inappropriate Procedures
Organisational
5
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
7
Process
Lack of Oversight
Poor
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
International/National
Standards
5
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
5
Inadequate Flag State
Statutory Factors Implementation
Category Total 86
Inadequate
Poor Shipborne and Shore
8
0
1
1
3
2
9
3
1
28
Supervision
Supervision
Planned
7
2
0
4
1
2
6
3
3
28
Inappropriate
Poor Shipborne
Operations
Operations
Failed to Correct Shipborne Related
9
3
0
3
1
1
6
2
1
26
Known Problems Shortcomings
6
1
1
3
2
1
2
3
3
22
Supervisory
Violations

Shipborne Violations
Category Total 104
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Preconditions (iii)
Unsafe Acts (iv)

Environmental
Factors
Crew Condition

Poor Physical Environment
Poor Technological
Environment
Negative Cognitive Factors
Poor Crew Interaction

0
3

0
0

0
0

0
2

0
1

0
1

4
4

0
1

1
1

5
13

4
3
4

1
0
1

1
0
1

2
3
3

3
0
2

2
0
2

7
5
5

3
0
4

5
1
4

28
12
26

4
5

2
2

0
1

3
2

1
1

0
1

Category Total 74
4
2
5
21
4
2
5
23

0
6

0
4

0
1

0
6

0
2

0
0

Personnel Factors Poor Personal Readiness
Skill-based errors
Decision and judgement
errors
Perceptual errors
Routine

1
0
0
1
6
4
3
32
Category Total 77
Total 91 20
9
43 21 14 77
34
42
351
Operator: C-Captain; CO-Chief Officer; 2O-2nd Officer; OO-Other Officer; AB-Able Seaman; OS-Ordinary Seaman; CEChief Engineer; 2E-2nd Engineer; OE-Other Engineer
Errors
Violations

Schröder-Hinrichs et al. (2010) analysed engine room space fires for reporting deficiencies pertaining to organisational factors. The
researchers found organisational factors were underrepresented, which could in part be due to the investigator applying the stopping
rule early or there could be a difficulty in understanding and applying IMO guidelines on casualty investigation. In their research,
unsafe supervision accounted for 3.8% of the coded items (p. 1190), while in this dissertation, supervision accounts for 30%
(104/351) in fire accident category and organisational influences account for 24.5% as against their 3.8%.
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Preconditions

Supervision

Organisational Influences

Table 18: Fire accident category ‘phase 0’ HFACS equipment overview; Source: Student according to taxonomy
Equipment Breakdown
L1
Sub-Category L2
Sub-Sub-Category L3
ME
AE
FO PUMP
Other
2
3
0
4
Resource Management
Poor Equipment/Facility Resources
1
0
0
2
Organisational Climate
Poor Work Culture
2
1
0
0
Inappropriate Procedures
1
0
0
0
Organisational Process
Lack of Oversight
Poor International/National
0
0
0
1
Statutory Factors
Standards
0
0
0
1
Inadequate Flag State
Statutory Factors
Implementation
Poor Shipborne and Shore
1
0
0
0
Inadequate Supervision
Supervision
Planned Inappropriate
1
0
0
0
Operations
Poor Shipborne Operations
0
0
0
1
Failed to Correct Known
Problems

Shipborne Related Shortcomings

Environmental Factors

Poor Physical Environment
Poor Technological Environment

Crew Condition

Negative Cognitive Factors

Personnel Factors

Poor Personal Readiness
Total

Equipment: ME-Main Engine; AE-Auxiliary Engine; FO Pump-Fuel Oil Pump
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Total
9
3
3
1
1
1
1
1
1

0

2

0

0

2

3
0

2
0

3
0

6
1

14
1

0

0

0

1

1

11

8

3

17

39

4.2.3.2 FIRE CATEGORY ‘PHASE 1’ OVERVIEW
In ‘phase 1’ of the fire, the indication of the threat is given by the equipment (CCTV,
alarms etc.) and human operators. The threat is largely detected by personnel on watch
keeping duty, who also analyse the threat and initiate threat mitigation action.
Figure 34: Fire ‘phase 1’ overview (L1-2); Source: Student, based on taxonomy
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Other

Threat mitigation actions in this phase usually include closing fire doors, cutting
oxygen supply to the area and shutting down engines among others.

Figure 35: Fire ‘phase 1’ overview (L3-4)
Source: Student, based on taxonomy
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‘Phase 1’ level 3-4, codes information related aspects, planning, decision making and
action and identifies if they were successful or not. According to the analysis, 104
times an aspect was applicable and successful while 47 times an applicable aspect was
unsuccessful. ‘Phase 1’ level attributes the failure to human or equipment (see figure
36 on page 69).

68

Figure 36: Fire ‘phase 1’ overview (L4-5)
Source: Student, based on taxonomy
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Human failure, specify

In phase 1, in each of the 47 instances, the failure was attributable to human operators.
Lack of success in phase 1, moves an accident into the next accident phase in which
the system health has to be evaluated after the accident has taken place.

69

4.2.3.3 FIRE CATEGORY ‘PHASE 2’ OVERVIEW
Figure 37: Fire ‘phase 2’ overview (L1-2); Source: Student, based on taxonomy
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In phase 2 (L1-2), once the fire has taken place, the system health is detected by various
on-board equipment like the fire alarms, heat detector, smoke detector, CCTV and
cameras. However it is noteworthy that the system health indication is largely
attributed to the human operators on duty, which are the officer of the watch and the
engineer officer on watch, who also detect system health. Unlike phase 1 which is the
beginning phase of the accident, in phase 2 the incident has progressed. While in phase
1, the threat analysis was largely conducted by the officers on site, in phase 2 the threat
analysis is predominantly carried out by the master and a host of emergency response
actions are carried out. Level 3-4 analyse the applicability and success and failure of
aspects of information (recording, transmission, receiving, and evaluation), planning
and decision and emergency response action.
Figure 38: Fire ‘phase 2’ overview (L3-4); Source: Student, based on taxonomy
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Figure 38 shows that in 50 instances an aspect was applicable and unsuccessful and
there were a total of 629 instances when an aspect was applicable and successful.
Figure 39: Fire ‘phase 2’ overview (L4-5); Source: Student, based on taxonomy
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In level 4-5 of ‘phase 2’ of the fire accident category, the failures of the preceding level
are specified to equipment or the human operator. In this phase of the fire accident out
of a total of 50 failures, 2 are attributable to equipment failure and 48 to human
operators.
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Although all of the vessels in the fire accident category were in compliance with
SOLAS equipment and certification requirements, however a number of times these
certificates have been issued without adequate verification and by cutting the corners
with respect to the safety checks. For e.g. Queen Mary 2, Harmonic Filters were not
tested during Continuous Survey of Machinery (CSM) surveys as required and failure
of this impacted the accident after almost two months (MAIB, 2011, p. 32). In the case
of M.V. Calypso, CO2 system was not tested as required and CO2 failed to release
during engine room fire. On investigation it was found that even the procedure posted
on-board were incorrect. Majority of the fire accidents on-board were due to the fuel
oil leakage in Auxiliary engines or Main engine. Which was largely due to the failure
to comply with standard good engineering practices during routine and non-routine
maintenance work. An aspect was the failure to comply with equipment /
manufacturers guidelines when overhauling or replacing / refitting the damaged parts
or leaking pipes. This also highlights inadequate training trends for engineers who
failed to refer to equipment manual during inspection and investigation of leaks or
failed to consult senior engineers in case of doubt, for e.g. M.V. Azamara Quest (MSI,
2013, p. 14, p. 22). Inadequate Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) also impacted the
accident, for e.g. Queen Mary 2, in which the Hi Fog system was fitted in
compartments containing the high voltage system.

All of the fire accidents finished in stage two due to good response from duty
engineers, officers of the watch as well as due to modern automatic firefighting
equipment on some ships which contributed positively. However at times due to lack
of training or a failure to understand the equipment / system limitations have resulted
in failure to contain the fire, for e.g. M.V. Carnival Splendor accident report (USCG,
2013, p. 6), where OOW performed a general reset on the fire detection system and by
doing so, the Hi-Fog system failed to activate automatically as it was designed to avoid
time delay. This initial mitigation measure could have contained the fire from
spreading, provided the OOW was aware of the system limitation.
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4.3 OVERVIEW OF THE RESULTS OF ALL 3 CATEGORIES – FLOODING, GROUNDING AND FIRE
This section combines the results obtained from all three accident categories and provides an overview of the findings.
Table 19: All accident categories ‘phase 0’ (HFACS) operator overview; Source: Student based on taxonomy
L1

Sub-Category L2

Resource
Management

Organisational Influences (i)

Organisational
Climate

Organisational
Process

Statutory Factors

Sub-Sub-Category L3
Lack of Human
Resources
Poor Technological
Resources
Poor Equipment /
Facility Resources
Disorganised Structure
Inadequate Policies
Poor Work Culture
Poorly Designed
Operation
Inappropriate
Procedure
Inappropriate
Procedures
Lack of Oversight
Poor
International/National
Standards
Inadequate Flag State
Implementation

C
11

CO
5

2O
2

Total Operator Break Down
OO AB OS H P CE
5
2
1
0 1
5

2E
4

OE
4

2

Total
40
2

2

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

3

2
3
18
9

1
0
7

0
0
4
1

0
0
7

0
0
2

0
0
1

1
1
4

0
0
3

0
0
4

4
4
54
10

1

3

7

7

4

0

0

2

0

0

2

0

1

9

6
4

1
0

0
0

1
0

0
0

0
0

0
0

0
0

0
0

8
4

6

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

6

Category Total 151
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Supervision (ii)
Preconditions (iii)
Unsafe Acts (iv)

Inadequate
Supervision
Planned
Inappropriate
Operations
Failed to Correct
Known Problems
Supervisory
Violations

Environmental
Factors

Crew Condition

Poor Shipborne and
Shore Supervision

Violations

3

3

3

3

2

9

3

1

45

21

9

3

7

1

2

3

6

3

4

59

17

7

2

3

1

1

2

6

2

1

42

19

5

3

6

2

1

2

3

3

44

Category Total 190
4
0
1
6

Poor Shipborne
Operations
Shipborne Related
Shortcomings
Shipborne Violations
Poor Physical
Environment
Poor Technological
Environment
Negative Cognitive
Factors
Poor Physiological State
Poor Crew Interaction

Personnel Factors Poor Personal Readiness

Errors

18

Skill-based errors
Decision and judgement
errors
Perceptual errors
Routine
Exceptional

Total

1

0

0

0

0

0

8

0

3

3

1

1

1

4

1

1

23

15

3

4

7

3

2

1

7

3

6

51

1
4

3
28
41

3
9
12

4
4

1
2

4
4

0
2

0
2

2
2
1

2

21
16

5
3

2
2

7
2

1
1

0
1

3

0
20
4

0
9
1

0
5
1

0
10

0
2

0
0

1

1
1

258

67

38

71

21

14

7

18

5
5

0
4

Category Total 152
4
2
5
51
4
2
5
36
1
6

0
4

0
3

1
61
7
Category Total 156
77
34
44
649

Operator: C-Captain; 2O-2nd Officer; OO-Other Officer; AB-Able Seaman; OS-Ordinary Seaman; H-Helmsman; P-Pilot; CE-Chief Engineer; 2E-2nd Engineer; OE-Other Engineer
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Table 19 on the preceding page provides an overview of all the 15 passenger ship
accidents coded for the dissertation under the ‘phase 0’ HFACS adapted taxonomy. A
total of 649 items were coded, of which a third were coded under the supervision
category (190, 30%), followed by unsafe acts (156, 24%), preconditions (152, 23%)
and organisational influences (151, 23%).
Figure 40: All accident categories ‘phase 0’ HFACS category overview
Source: Student
190

200
180
160

151

152

156

Preconditions

Unsafe Acts

140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
Organisational
Influences

Supervision

All the subcategories under supervision – inadequate supervision, planned
inappropriate operations, failed to correct known problems and supervisory violations
were coded highly. Under organisational influences, the category of poor work culture
was coded 54 times, which is a cause for concern. Under the category of preconditions,
negative cognitive factors were coded 51 times and under the category of unsafe acts,
skill based errors were coded 51 times and routine violations 61 times. Poor work
culture will be discussed further in chapter 6.

The captain was coded 258 times out of 649 (40%), followed by the chief engineer
(12%), other officer (11%) and chief officer (10%).
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Table 20: All accident categories ‘phase 0’ (HFACS) equipment overview
Source: Student based on taxonomy
1

Sub-Category L2

Supervision (ii)

Organisational Influences (i)

Resource
Management

Organisational Climate

Organisational Process
Statutory Factors
Statutory Factors

Sub-Sub-Category L3
Poor Technology Resource
Poor Equipment/Facility
Resources
Disorganized Structure
Inadequate Policies
Poor Work Culture
Poorly Designed Operation
Inappropriate Procedures
Lack of Oversight
Poor International /
National Standards
Inadequate Flag State
Implementation

Inadequate
Supervision
Planned Inappropriate
Operations

Poor Shipborne and Shore
Supervision
Poor Shipborne
Operations

Supervisory Violations
Failed to Correct
Known Problems

Shipborne Violations
Shipborne Related
Shortcomings

ME

2

Total Equipment Breakdown
AE FO PUMP Other Navigation Aids (AIS,
Steering
ECDIS, Radar, GPS, etc.) Equipment
2
1
3
0
4
1
1

1

2

1

0

0

4
1

2
1
0

1
0
0

0
0
0

2
0
1

5
1
1

0

0

0

1

1

1

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

Total
3
10

6
1

Organisational Influences Category Total: 30
1
1

2

1

1
1

Supervision Category Total: 5
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Preconditions
(iii)

0

2

0

1

3

2

3

8

1

4

1

18

Environmental Factors

Poor Physical Environment
Poor Technological
Environment

Crew Condition

Negative Cognitive Factors

0

0

0

2

2

Personnel Factors

Poor Personal Readiness

0

0

0

1

1

11

8

3

29

Total

1

Preconditions Category Total: 25
3
6
60

A total of 60 items were coded in the ‘phase 0’ HFACS coding for technical subjects (equipment). Organisational influences were
coded the highest (30, 50%), followed by preconditions (25, 41%) and supervision (5, 9%). Under organisational influences,
attention needs to be paid to the subcategory of poor equipment/facility resources which was coded 10 times (17%). Under
preconditions, sub-sub category of poor technological environment received a high coding of 18 (30%) which would further need
to be evaluated.

Among the equipment, the main engine (11, 18%) and the auxiliary engines (8, 13%) received a high coding. A high 50% of
equipment coded available under the ‘other’ equipment category. The raw data pertaining to the other equipment would be used to
expand the SEMOMAP taxonomy.

Table 21 on the following page provides an overview of all three accident categories in all the three phases for taxonomy level 3-4
and 4-5 evaluation. The table shows that the fire accident category went into two phases and the bulk of the effort is concentrated in
‘phase 2’. The table also shows that the flooding accident finished within ‘phase 1’ itself.
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Table 21: All accident categories, all phases, level 3-4 and 4-5 evaluation; Source: Student
N
o

1

Nature of
Accident

Fire

Phase

Phase-1

Phase-2

Phase-3

2 Flooding

Phase-1

Phase-2

Phase-3

Stages

Threat Indication
Threat Detection
Threat Analysis
Threat Prevention Action
System Health Indication
System Health Detection
System Health Analysis
Emergency Response Action
Emergency Response & Evacuation Action
System Health Indication
System Health Detection
System Health Analysis
Threat Indication
Threat Detection
Threat Analysis
Threat Prevention Action
System Health Indication
System Health Detection
System Health Analysis
Emergency Response Action
Emergency Response & Evacuation Action
System Health Indication
System Health Detection
System Health Analysis

Number of
Subjects

6
2
3
5
9
3
3
9

1
1
1
1
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Number of
events

28
42
42
42
124
186
186
186
0
0
0
0
2
3
3
3
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

process fail/safe status
Safe

Fail

28
34
28
14
124
183
174
148

0
8
14
25
0
3
12
35

Not
Applicable
0
0
0
3
0
0
0
3

2
3
3
3

0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0

Failure
source
Human
Failure
0
8
14
25
0
3
12
33

Equipment
Failure
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2

0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0

3 Grounding

Phase-1

Phase-2

Phase-3

Threat Indication
Threat Detection
Threat Analysis
Threat Prevention Action
System Health Indication
System Health Detection
System Health Analysis
Emergency Response Action
Emergency Response & Evacuation Action
System Health Indication
System Health Detection
System Health Analysis

6
3
2
2
5
3
3
3
6
2
2
1

20
30
30
33
36
54
54
60
21
14
21
21

11
9
4
5
32
53
42
43
21
14
21
21

3
9
9
10
2
0
11
17
0
0
0
0

6
12
17
18
2
1
1
0
0
0
0
0

3
9
9
10
2
0
11
17
0
0
0
0

The grounding accident category in table 21 above shows that the accident entered into the third phase of evacuation and the bulk
of efforts were concentrated in ‘phase 2’.

Table 22 on the following page presents an overview of each time a human operator was applicable and successful or unsuccessful
and each time an equipment was applicable and successful or unsuccessful.
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0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Table 22: All accident categories, all phases, level 3-4 and 4-5 evaluation
Source: Student
Category

Phase

Human operator

Equipment

Applicable

Applicable

Successful

Unsuccessful

Successful

Total

Unsuccessful

Flooding

Phase 1

11

Fire

Phase 1

104

47

Phase 2

629

48

29

31

60

Phase 2

170

30

200

Phase 3

77

Grounding Phase 1

Total

1020

11
151
2

679

77
156

2

1178

Table 22 shows that the equipment only failed 2 times when applicable and the human
operator failed 156 times (13%) and succeeded 1020 times (87%). Timing is crucial in
on-board accident situations. The success of the human operators in phase 1 of the
flooding incident averted a more serious accident and the successes of the human
operators in ‘phase 2’ of the fire accident category prevented the fire accidents from
going further into the next evacuation accident phase. Failure in a phase leads the
accident to progress to the next subsequent phase, however the analysis shows that the
recovery from accidents is creditable to the successes of human operators (Reason,
2008).
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Table 23: Timelines: all accident categories across all phases
Source: Student
Category

Vessel Name

Phase 1

Phase 2

Phase 3

Flooding

M.V. Saga Sapphire

00H 02M 00S

--

--

Total 2 Min
Fire

M.V. Azamara Quest

00H 03M 00S

00H 01M 29S

--

M.V. Carnival Spirit

--

--

--

M.V. Carnival

00H 02M 00S

09H 13M 00S

--

RMS Queen Mary 2

00H 36M 00S

00H 24M 00S

--

M.V. Royal Princess

00H 00M 45S

04H 32M 00S

--

M.V. Star Princess

00H 19M 00S

01H 27M 00S

--

M.V. The Calypso

NA

00H 38M 00S

--

M.V. Zenith

00H 20 M 00S

01H 28M 00S

--

Splendor

Total 80 Min 45 Sec 17 Hr 43 Min
Average time 13 Min
Grounding

2 Hr 31 Min

M.V. Lauren L

01H 17M 00S

Not mentioned

Not mentioned

M.V. Clipper

00H 32 M 00S

Not mentioned

Not mentioned

M.V. Deutschland

00H 06M 15S

00H 08M 37S

--

M.V. Van Gogh

00H 02M 00S

00H 03M 00S

--

M.V. Astor

00H 04M 00S

00H 03M 00S

--

M.V. Monarch of the

00H 03M 00S

01 H 05 M 00S 02H 55M

Adventure

Seas
Total 2 H 4 M 15 S
Average time 20 Min

1 H 19 M 37 S

2 H 53 M

20 Min

2 H 53 M

Table 23 depicts the timelines applicable to all phases across all accidents. It can be
seen that the time in phase 1 for the flooding accident category was only two minutes
and the accident did not progress further. In the fire accident category, the bulk of the
efforts were concentrated in phase 2 with an average of 2 hours and 31 minutes and
the accident not progress to the evacuation phase. In the grounding accident category,
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phase 1 and 2 took an average of 20 minutes each. It is noteworthy that the average of
the grounding accident category for phase 2 is distorted as one vessel, M.V. Monarch
of the Seas had a high phase 2 timeline of one hour and five minutes which affected
the average. Going by the other three vessels that have provided timelines for
grounding (M.V. Deutschland, M.V. Van Gogh and M.V. Astor), the phase 2 timeline
in grounding accidents is between 3 and 8 minutes. M.V. Monarch of the Seas moved
into phase 3 of evacuation and therefore spend considerable time in both phases 2 and
3. The other two vessels that evacuated passengers (M.V. Lauren L and M.V. Clipped
Adventurer), did not mention timelines for phases 2 and 3 and therefore the timeline
analysis is incomplete. It is to be noted that the timeline analysis is not robust as all of
the accident investigation reports had not mentioned clear timelines. This analysis is
indicative of the insights one can gain if standardised reporting procedures include
timelines in the reports.

4.4 SUMMARY
This chapter has presented the findings of the dissertation across all accident
categories, phases and taxonomy levels according to the SEMOMAP accident
investigation model and its complementary taxonomy. The following chapter reflects
on the findings.
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5 DISSERTATION REFLECTIONS
This chapter reflects upon the findings of the dissertation and discusses how the
research questions have been answered in the dissertation.

5.1 REFLECTION ON SEMOMAP
SEMOMAP as a maritime accident investigation model has tremendous potential. It
is extremely useful to consider the accident process to reveal insights that could help
us ultimately to learn from accidents and prevent them from recurring in the future.
SEMOMAP is a robust model that incorporates both HFACS and TRACEr
taxonomies, allowing for the identification of factors impinging on the accident
situation removed in time. However, worthwhile to note here is that the analysis
utilising SEMOMAP is largely dependent on the quality of the accident investigation
report, which will be discussed further in this chapter

The SEMOMAP taxonomy can be further expanded to be more comprehensive and
specific. It could include other ranks on-board to make it more specific. In case of
passenger ships they have other staff which is not reflected in the taxonomy (e.g. Staff
Captain, Customer service, Safety officer, Staff Chief Engineer, Hotel Staff, etc.). In
the electronic database platform created in MaRiSa, WMU to facilitate SEMOMAP
coding, ‘other’ additional human operators are not included in the category as it
accepts the first entry. This can be resolved to be more specific about the ‘other’ human
operators involved.

Muster passengers and muster crew should be depicted separately in the taxonomy as
these are two different actions most of the times and occur at different time intervals.
Under communication, the urgency message / distress message can be included in the
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taxonomy. The critical equipment list can be expanded to be more exclusive as most
of the time these are involved in the accident (quick closing valves, harmonic filters,
etc.).

The taxonomy could consider including MAIB, NTSB, USCG etc. under the
investigating authorities. Analysis of the report depends upon the quality of the
investigation report as well as the investigator and assessor, as many reports may be
investigated by a technical expert who has none or limited in depth training on Human
element or factors. So he/she is likely to miss out key human element or human factors
issues which may have contributed to the accident or incident. Therefore it is
imperative to follow a uniform standard for accident investigation where all aspects
are covered / approached with equal importance. It is worth noting that investigation
reports conducted by USCG and ATSB are much more comprehensive than other
reports which were conducted by some flag states. When analysing these reports one
gets a much broader and clearer picture about the various contributory factors. A
research on various investigating bodies and a comparison of their findings itself will
be highly valuable and can contribute positively in drawing future guidelines for
accident investigation of the IMO.

The NTSB is an independent governmental agency charged with determining the
probable cause of transportation accidents and promoting transportation safety in the
United States, whereas in some other states it may not be the same and they might not
be in a position to conduct similar independent investigations due to lack of freedom.

For further validation of SEMOMAP, professional researchers from different
spectrum of the industry must be considered (operational, academics, inspectors etc.).
They should be given similar case studies for the analysis and the outcome must be
compared for further improvement and amendment. This will help in making the
model more robust to meet diverse complex requirements.
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5.2 REFLECTION ON RESULTS AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS
All the research questions, the student had identified in the beginning of the
dissertation have been adequately answered in the preceding chapters. This section
provides a reflection on them.


Is the maritime industry specific SEMOMAP suitable to explore maritime
accidents?
This research question has been answered adequately in chapter 4 on the
analysis of accident investigation reports. The model has undergone
comprehensive testing and evaluation in the analysis of 15 accident
investigation reports and has served the student well by not being generic but
rather specific to the maritime domain with a nuanced understanding of its
language, personnel, operations, equipment and shipboard and shore based
dimensions.



What is it about the unique unfolding of the accident process on board and
the shipboard behaviours and barriers, if any, that can lead to different
accident outcomes for different accidents.
The time of reaction to a developing dangerous situation and corresponding
evaluation of applicable and successful/unsuccessful aspects leads to different
outcomes for different vessels. The majority of the fire accidents were the
result of inadequate investigation of the underlying causes by the responsible
engineers and failure to comply with standard procedures. This occurred
despite frequent break down and parameter alarms (e.g. M.V. Carnival
Splendor (USCG, 2013)) where auxiliary engine frequently tripped due to
overload and torsional vibration alarm from the equipment. In another case of
M.V. Azamara Quest (MSI, 2013), the auxiliary engine was made to run on
load directly after the repair was performed for fuel oil leakage and without
conducting any test run as necessary to ensure that the repair was successful.
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Accident investigation with a focus on the involved processes and actions
reveals unique insights into on-board work culture. The case of M.V. Azamara
Quest, highlights that the accident could have been completely averted in
‘phase 1’ itself if the motor man who had detected the fuel oil leak had the
authority to tackle it locally. He reported the risk to the second engineer on the
VHF who came down to confirm the source of the leak and assess the situation
and then decided to stop the generator remotely from the control room instead
of locally taking care of the risk. This costly time delay resulted in a fullfledged fire incident which resulted in a severe loss to the vessel. This aspect
highlights among others, the lack of authority of the lower ranked motor man
to deal with issues locally; the complacency of the second engineer which
resulted in loss of time and poor decision of the second engineer to remotely
turn off the generator. This is especially more important when given the fact
that most of the fire accidents were caused due to fuel oil leakage. Any leakage
from critical equipment with hot surfaces around, should be dealt with, without
any time delay. However, in some cases where vigilant crew responded swiftly,
they managed to contain the fire and loss was mitigated. This highlights that
good practices and additional barriers on-board can certainly help in mitigating
loss.


What are the common processes in emergency situations on-board in case
of fire, grounding and flooding?
In majority of the cases they followed the routine SMS procedures for the
particular emergency, however at times failed to comply with the same which
could be due to lack of training and/or complacency, among other factors. In
case of flooding no claims can be made about common processes as only one
accident was analysed under the category. In fire it is noteworthy that in all
accidents the first phase is relatively short and if the threat is not detected and
mitigated swiftly, it develops quickly into an accident and enters ‘phase 2’. It
is noteworthy that in most firefighting accidents, ‘phase 2’ is long as the bulk
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of the firefighting efforts are concentrated in this phase. In the grounding
accident category, most of the accidents have a short phase 1 and a short phase
2. It can be safely assumed that they would then have a longer phase 3 as that
would involve evacuation.


How much time is available to recover from an emergency situation
during the different phases of the accident?

The majority of the accident investigation reports do not provide a very good
time line and therefore it is difficult to make claims related to time analysis.
However this is a potential aspect that SEMOMAP allows to be evaluated.


How realistic is the time limit of 30 minutes required for abandoning ship,
post breach of threshold.

All three vessels that conducted evacuations only did it for the passengers and
no timelines are provided for crew transfer. M.V. Monarch of the Seas had 2557
passengers and 831 Crew members, M.V. Clipper Adventurer 128 passengers
and 69 Crew members on-board and M.V. Lauren L had only 38 passengers
and the number of crew member was not mentioned in the report. They
remained on-board for further duration.
o

M.V. Clipper Adventurer

The grounding incident occurred on 27th Aug at 1832 Lt and all passengers
were mustered at 1910 Lt, which is almost after 38 minutes delay and since the
vessel was firmly aground; after assessing the situation, passengers were asked
to stand down at approximately 2030 Lt. The total number of passengers onboard at the time of the incident was 128 and 69 crew. The passengers were
transferred to another vessel on the 29th August at 1000 Lt.
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Although the passengers were transferred safely from all ships however the
time taken to transfer them was not clearly defined and certainly it was much
more than the 30 minutes time window as required by the IMO.

One of the observations made during this analysis is that during most of these
emergencies, the passengers were not updated and mustered immediately after
the accident. This can lead to a dangerous situation as it is difficult to hide an
impact or blackout on-board. Waiting till the last minute, keeping the
passengers uninformed can cause panic and uncertainty. Therefore, it is
recommended that whenever there is an accident on-board, it is imperative to
muster the crew and passengers without delay, and continue system
assessments as appropriate. In case the situation is not so serious the passengers
and crew can be stood down later on.
o M.V. Monarch of the Seas
The grounding incident occurred on 15th December at 0130 Lt and all the
passengers were mustered at 0148 Lt. The portside lifeboats were lowered at
0210 and STBD side at 0215. However after assessing the damage the master
decided to ground the vessel intentionally at 0235 Lt this was done to minimise
the chances of flooding and foundering. Since vessel was close to the port the
master decided to use tenders for transferring passengers from the ship to shore.
At 0245 first tender came alongside and at 0519 they completed the passenger
disembarkation operation. The operation took around 02h 34m which is much
more than the IMO’s limit of 30 minutes and this is when the vessel was resting
on the reef. The total number of passengers on-board at the time of incident
was 2557 and 831 crew members.
o M.V. Lauren L
M.V. Lauren L had only 38 passengers and the number of crew members
number was not mentioned in the report. They remained on-board for further
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duration. The timeline for the transfer operation is also not mentioned in the
report.

With a limited number of evacuation incidents, it is difficult to confirm the
validity of the IMO’s time requirement, however, in the above accidents it
certainly took much more time to evacuate the passengers as compared to the
30 minute time limit. Delay in mustering the passengers is a major cause for
concern and this approach highlights the lack of training and standardised
procedures in such an emergency. This needs to be highlighted further to create
mandatory procedures to ensure that passengers are informed and mustered
without delay in case of an incident or accident on-board.

5.3 SUMMARY
Reports from NTSB, USCG, MAIB and BSU covered the investigation in depth
whereas some other administration and investigating agency reports were shallow
without adequate timeline or further information. A majority of the accidents were
attributed to human error and SEMOMAP has the strength to investigate how humans
mitigate accidents on-board.

Accident investigation reports should include the

positive human contribution and support SEMOMAP in studying this aspect. In some
cases the reports have highlighted the need of further training etc., but unfortunately
these accidents were found to be recurring on ships supposedly manned by well-trained
officers and crew. The question is, are we looking in the right direction? If so, why are
we unable to minimize these accidents? And what needs to be improved so that we can
get positive results on a global level?

SEMOMAP is a step in the right direction with respect to maritime accident
investigation and should be utilised to study accident cases to reveal comprehensive
insights into accident processes and what action we might recommend at which stage
to stop the situation from escalating further.
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6 CONCLUSIONS
The SEMOMAP model and its accompanying taxonomy are robust for the purpose of
maritime accident investigation. Most of the accidents analysed in this dissertation
highlight a lack of inadequate risk assessment and non-compliance with SMS in line
with the ISM code. The results revealed among other issues, a poor work culture onboard and negative cognitive attitudes. It is important to sensitise the shipping industry
and academic community to HFACS aspects in connection with on-board accident
processes which can be analysed with SEMOMAP. This can help us to understand
recovery from accident situations and help us to learn in detail about accident
processes, in addition to the other factors impacting the accidents.

Given the dissertation findings, effective implementation of rules and regulations like
the ISM code is essential for increasing overall safety and reducing risk on-board
ships2. The theme for the 2014 World Maritime day is the effective implementation of
IMO conventions (IMO, 2014b). Mandatory compliance is required with the ISM with
the introduction of chapter IX into SOLAS - “Management for the Safe Operation of
Ships”. The ISM code links the flag, the owner and the vessel and requires a
customized SMS tailored to suit the company needs to improve on-board safety
(Baldwin and Cave, 1999).
Regarding the ISM code, Bhattacharya (2012a, p. 528) found ‘a wide gap between its
intended purpose and practice’. The researcher found a lack of seafarers’ participation
and the underlying causal factors were located in poor employment conditions and low
trust relationships.

2

A previous version on the implementation of the ISM code has been submitted by the student for
MSEA 253, Maritime Human Element assignment.
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Learning from incidents on board is essential to enhance shipboard safety. The selfregulatory nature of the ISM code requires for shipboard incidents to be reported,
investigated and analyzed (Bhattacharya, 2012b, p. 4). Batalden & Sydnes (2014)
found that the main challenges pertained to four sections of the ISM code: Section 5 –
Master’s responsibility; Section 6 – resources and personnel; Section 7 – development
of plans for shipboard operation and Section 12 – company, verification, review and
evaluation. The findings of the HFACS coding of this dissertation are in a similar
direction and need to be addressed to contribute to the on-board safety culture.

The ISM code has contributed to safety (Heijari and Tapaninen, 2010) and should be
effectively implemented to reap the benefits. There is a link between the
organizational safety climate and employee safety compliance which leads to
increased employee participation and reduction in accidents (Clarke, 2006).
Management of shipboard safety requires building and sustaining a safety culture on
board (Havold, 2010, Ek et al., 2014). Company and on-board implementation of the
ISM code should address the safety of shipping by taking into account the human
element (Hetherington et al., 2006).
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Appendix 1: Detail list of accident investigation reports
No

Ship Name

IMO No

Flag

Classification

1

M.V. Zenith

8918136

Malta

Germanischer
Lloyds

2

M.V. Azamara
Quest

9210218

Malta

Lloyds’
Register

Nature of
accident
Fire

Fire

Narrative and report Source
On 25 June 2013, at 0335, the fire alarm sounded in the engine-room of the
Maltese registered passenger ship Zenith. Upon investigation, a fire was
noticed on the starboard father main engine. The seat of the fire was between
the turbocharger and cylinder head no. 1. Immediate actions were taken by
the crew members to contain the fire and ensure the safety of all persons on
board. The safety investigation identified that the immediate cause of the fire
was the fracture of a low carbon steel pipe on a fuel damping cylinder
assembly on the starboard father main engine. This fracture led to the release
of gas oil, at a pressure of about 6 bars, which sprayed on an exposed high
temperature area of the main engine exhaust gas manifold. The MSIU has
issued one recommendation to the Company intended to enhance the vessels
maintenance regime vis-à-vis all the critical equipment installed in the
machinery spaces.
https://mti.gov.mt/en/Pages/MSIU/Safety-Investigations-2014.aspx
On 30 March 2012, Azamara Quest departed Manila, Philippines for
Sandakan, Malaysia as her next planned call on her cruise itinerary. There
were 1001 persons on board, i.e. 590 passengers and 411 crew members. At
around 2000, a fire broke out on diesel generator no. 4 whilst it was being
tested following repairs on a leaking fuel oil return pipe. The prime mover was
shut down, and the low pressure water mist firefighting system automatically
activated. The fuel oil quick closing valves were closed and the ventilation to
the engine-room stopped. Thereafter, at 2006, the vessel suffered a complete
blackout as all the other generator engines stopped working. The crew and
passengers were mustered and the crew fire parties entered the main engineroom to assess the fire. At about 2043, the staff chief engineer reported that
the fire had been extinguished and thereafter, some fire doors and shell doors
were subsequently opened to ventilate the heavy smoke out of the affected
area. Power to Azamara Quest’s engines was restored in the evening of 31
March and the vessel resumed her passage at slow speed. She entered
Sandakan Harbour on 01 April with one crew member in a critical condition as
a result of smoke inhalation.

https://mti.gov.mt/en/Pages/MSIU/Safety-Investigations-2012.aspx
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3

M.V. Carnival
Spirit

9188647

Malta

Lloyds’
Register

Fire

At 1818 (LT) on 30 December 2012, a fire broke out in the women sauna room
of the passenger vessel Carnival Spirit, whilst en route from Mystery Island,
Vanuatu to Sydney Australia. Automatic fire/heat detection devices activated
and alerted the crew. Although the fire was contained inside the sauna room,
the fixed water dry sprinkler system did not activate and the fire was
extinguished manually. The safety investigation has concluded that the fire
was caused by the placement of the women’s sauna wooden cedar floor grate
on top of the frame work surrounding the sauna’s heating element/hot stones.
An examination of the dry sprinkler pipe and check valve revealed that the
latter was blocked in the closed position and did not open due to
corrosion/oxidation of the valve seat. The safety investigation has also found
that there were no specific maintenance records for the fixed dry sprinkler
system in the sauna. In view of the safety actions taken by the ship managers,
no recommendations have been made.
https://mti.gov.mt/en/Pages/MSIU/Safety-Investigations-2012.aspx

4

M.V. Carnival
Splendor

9333163

Panama

Lloyds’
Register

Fire

On November 8, 2010 at 0600 (Local Time), the Carnival Splendor was
underway off the coast of Mexico when the vessel suffered a major mechanical
failure in the number five diesel generator. As a result, engine components,
lube oil and fuel were ejected through the engine casing and caused a fire at
the deck plate level between generators five and six in the aft engine room
which eventually ignited the cable runs overhead. The fire in the cable runs
was relatively small, but produced a significant volume of smoke which
hampered efforts to locate and extinguish it. In addition, the fire caused
extensive damage to the cables in the aft engine room, which contributed to
the loss of power. Post casualty analysis of the event revealed that the
installed Hi-Fog system for local protection was activated 15 minutes after the
initial fire started. This delay was the result of a bridge watch stander resetting
the fire alarm panel on the bridge. This was a critical error which allowed the
fire to spread to the overhead cables and eventually caused the loss of power.
While the fire was eventually self-extinguished, the failure of the installed CO2
system and the poor execution of the firefighting plan contributed to the
ineffectiveness of the crew’s firefighting effort.
https://homeport.uscg.mil/mycg/portal/ep/contentView.do?channelId=18374&contentId=460088&programId=21431&programPage=%2Fep%2Fpro
gram%2Feditorial.jsp&pageTypeId=13489&contentType=EDITORIAL

94

5

RMS Queen
Mary 2

9241061

United
Kingdom

Lloyds’
Register

Fire

6

M.V. Royal
Princess

9210220

Bermuda

NA

Fire
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At 0425 on 23 September 2010, as RMS Queen Mary 2 (QM2) was
approaching Barcelona, an explosion occurred in the vessel’s aft main
switchboard room. Within a few seconds, all four propulsion motors shut down,
and the vessel blacked out shortly afterwards. Fortunately, the vessel was
clear of navigational hazards and drifted in open sea. The emergency
generator started automatically and provided essential supplies to the vessel,
and it was quickly established that the explosion had taken place in the aft
harmonic filter (HF) room, situated within the aft main switchboard. The aft
main switchboard was isolated, main generators were restarted and the ship
was able to resume passage at 0523, subsequently berthing in Barcelona at
about 0900. No one was injured. The accident caused extensive damage to
the aft HF and surrounding structure. Two water-mist fire suppression spray
heads were activated, one in the aft harmonic filter room and the other in the
aft main switchboard room. The explosion was triggered by deterioration in the
capacitors in the aft HF. Internal arcing between the capacitor plates
developed, which vaporised the dielectric medium causing the internal
pressure to increase, until it caused the capacitor casing to rupture. Dielectric
fluid vapour sprayed out, igniting and creating the likely conditions for an arcflash to occur between the 11000 volt bus bars that fed power to the aft HF. A
current imbalance detection system, which was the only means to warn
against capacitor deterioration, was found to be inoperable, and it was evident
that it had not worked for several years.
http://www.maib.gov.uk/cms_resources.cfm?file=/QM2Report.pdf
In the evening of 18th of June 2009, a few minutes before 20:00 hours Royal
Princess departed from Port Said, Egypt having spent the day alongside there
as a planned call on her cruise itinerary. On board were 733 passengers and
a crew of 393 giving total number of persons on board of 1126. As the vessel
passed between the breakwaters leaving Port Said a fire broke out on diesel
generator No4. This unit and unit No. 2 were both in operation providing power
for the ship. A number of alarm conditions alerted the automation system of a
pending loss of power from No.4 and diesel generator No.1 started
automatically and took up the electrical load in conjunction with No. 2.
Propulsion was maintained and the Captain made for the first available
anchorage. Crew fire parties were mustered and an attempt was made to enter
the engine room but the team were beaten back by smoke and heat.
Passengers were called to muster stations and looked after there by the
passenger services teams. A decision to tackle the fire with the CO2 total
flooding system was quickly made and as soon as the vessel was in a position

to anchor the engine room was sealed, machinery stopped and CO2 injected.
Boundary cooling was maintained where necessary and temperatures were
seen to reduce quite quickly after the CO2 injection. Passengers were held at
muster stations until just after midnight when they were allowed more freedom
to access open decks in view of the heat in muster stations in June in Egypt
with no air conditioning and limited ventilation. At about 0041 hours an entry
was made to the engine room which confirmed that the fire was extinguished
and shortly afterwards passengers were allowed to return to their cabins to
rest.
http://www.bermudashipping.bm

7

M.V. Star
Princess

9192363

Bermuda

RINA

Fire

At 0309 (UTC+5) on 23 March 2006, a fire was detected on board the cruise
ship Star Princess. The ship was on passage from Grand Cayman to Montego
Bay, Jamaica, with 2690 passengers and 1123 crew on board. The fire was
investigated by the Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) on behalf of
the Bermuda Maritime Administration, in co-operation with the United States
Coast Guard (USCG), and the United States’ National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB). The fire started on an external stateroom balcony sited on deck
10 in the centre of main vertical zone 3, on the vessel’s port side. It was
probably caused by a discarded cigarette end heating combustible materials
on a balcony, which smoldered for about 20 minutes before flames developed.
Once established, the fire spread rapidly along adjacent balconies and,
assisted by a strong wind over the deck, it spread up to decks 11 &12 and onto
stateroom balconies in fire zones 3 and 4 within 6 minutes. After a further 24
minutes, it had spread to zone 5. The fire also spread into the staterooms as
the heat of the fire shattered the glass in stateroom balcony doors, but was
contained by each stateroom’s fixed fire-smothering system, the restricted
combustibility of their contents, and their thermal boundaries. As the fire
progressed, large amounts of dense black smoke were generated from the
combustible materials on the balconies, and the balcony partitions. This smoke
entered the adjacent staterooms and alleyways, and hampered the evacuation
of the passengers, particularly on deck 12. One passenger died as a result of
smoke inhalation, and 13 others were treated for the effects of the smoke.
http://www.maib.gov.uk/cms_resources.cfm?file=/star%20princess.pdf

8

M.V. The
Calypso

NA

Cyprus

Lloyds’
Register

Fire
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At 0330 ship’s time on 6 May 2006, the Cypriot registered cruise ship The
Calypso suffered an engine room fire while on passage from Tilbury to St.

Peter Port, Guernsey, with 708 passengers and crew on board. Initial action
by the watch keeping engineer officer was effective in eventually extinguishing
the fire although the vessel lost all but emergency electrical power and was
left drifting in the south-west lane of the Dover Straits Traffic Separation
Scheme (TSS), 16 miles south of Beachy Head. The vessel’s starboard main
engine had been very seriously damaged and she was towed to the port of
Southampton by the Maritime and Coastguard Agency’s (MCA) emergency
towing vessel Anglian Monarch.

9

M.V. Saga
Sapphire

7822457

Malta

Germanischer
Lloyds

Flooding

10

M.V. Lauren L

9246827

Malta

Germanischer Grounding
Lloyds

97

http://www.maib.gov.uk/publications/investigation_reports/2007/calypso.cfm?
view=print&
On 06 January 2013, at 0050 (UTC), Saga Sapphire experienced a flooding in
a number of forward compartments during a ballast operation, while in the
English Channel on passage from El Ferrol to Southampton. The flooding
effected deck no. 6 forward (Hotel Store Compartment), deck no. 5 forward
(Hotel Carpenters’ Workshop Area) and the bow thruster space. The flooding,
which reduced the vessel’s GM height by 34 cm, was discovered at 0038
(UTC) during a fire patrol. The ingress of water also damaged the bow thruster
motor. There were no reported injuries or pollution. The direct cause of the
flooding was a crack, which developed in the vent / overflow pipe during the
ballasting of deep tank no. 1, which was being conducted without adequate
supervision. The safety investigation also found less than adequate watch
handover procedures. Moreover, the rubber seal of the watertight cover to the
bow thruster flat was damaged. As a result of the safety investigation, the
MSIU has issued one recommendation aimed to enhance the vessel’s safe
ballast operations.
https://mti.gov.mt/en/Pages/MSIU/Safety-Investigations-2014.aspx
On 01 April 2012, at 1318 (LT), the passenger vessel Lauren L sailed from La
Digue to Praslin in Seychelles. The intention was to seek a sheltered
anchorage on the north-west side of Praslin, where it would have been
possible to land the passengers with the vessel’s tenders onto an appropriate
beach. After transiting the Baie Curieuse Channel, Lauren L headed west past
the northern coast of Praslin. Approaching the planned anchoring position on
a roughly south westerly heading, the vessel ran aground at 1435 on a rock
pinnacle charted as an isolated danger at a depth of 1.7 m. Lauren L was
refloated at 1820. An inspection revealed that the damage was confined to the
bow thruster compartment and in way of the grey water tank. The safety
investigation concluded that bridge navigational equipment, in particular the

ECDIS, was not utilised to its full potential. There were also shortcomings in
the bridge team composition. MSIU has issued three recommendations to the
company designed to address the navigational procedures and practices on
board and the use of VDR data.

11

12

M.V. Clipper
Adventure

M.V.
Deutschland

NA

9141807

Bahamas

Germany

NA

Grounding

Germanischer Grounding
Lloyds

98

https://mti.gov.mt/en/Pages/MSIU/Safety-Investigations-2013.aspx
Upon departure from Port Epworth, the Clipper Adventurer followed the
planned course along a single line of soundings at 13.9 knots. The chief officer
who was in charge of the watch monitored the vessel’s progress using parallel
indexing on the starboard radar and monitored the water depth on the echosounder. The master monitored the portside radar when on the bridge. Once
clear of Port Epworth and on course 300°gyro, the vessel was placed on
autopilot and proceeded at 13.9 12F12F 13 knots. The quartermaster
remained on the bridge, to take over the steering when required. Shortly after
departing Port Epworth, the chief officer marked a depth of 66 m on the chart
in an area near where the chart indicated a depth of 40 m. At 1832, the vessel
ran aground on a shoal in position 67°58.2' N and 112°40.3' W and listed 5 °
to port. The vessel grounded on hard rock shelf from approximately the
forepeak to amidships. This was a previously reported shoal not marked on
the chart in use.
http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapportsreports/marine/2010/m10h0006/m10h0006.asp
The passenger ship DEUTSCHLAND was on a cruise through the group of
islands off southern Chile and reached the Italia Glacier in the northern arm of
the Beagle Channel on Sunday 15 January 2012 at about 2300. The master,
an officer on watch, a helmsman and a pilot were on the bridge. A few minutes
before reaching the glacier, the ship’s command asked the pilot if it would be
acceptable to sail closer to the glacier than planned so as to provide
passengers with the best possible view of this area. The pilot responded with
a decision to reduce the speed and sail much closer to the glacier. The
DEUTSCHLAND grounded on her starboard side as she was turning back
towards the middle of the fjord two cables away from the coastline. The engine
was stopped immediately and instructions to establish the damage to the ship
were given. It was possible to move the ship back in the direction of the middle
of the fjord by means of various engine and helm manoeuvres a short time
later and continue the voyage to the next port. Damage to the ship or
environment was not found.

13

14

M.V. Van
Gogh

M.V. Astor

7359400

8506373

Marshall
Island

Bahamas

Det Norske
Veritas

Grounding

Germanischer Grounding
Lloyds
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http://www.bsu-bund.de
At about 1817 on 23 February 2008, the Marshall Islands registered passenger
ship Van Gogh grounded briefly on the western shore of the Mersey River
during a departure from Devonport, Tasmania. The ship was under the
conduct of a harbour pilot who had taken over the conduct from the master
about five minutes before, after the master had manoeuvred the ship off the
berth. As the ship left the berth, it began to be set towards the bulk carrier
Goliath berthed ahead. Van Gogh was under the influence of the ebb tide and
fresh water that was flowing from the Mersey River’s catchment following
heavy rain in the area in the previous 24 hours. Van Gogh was difficult to
manoeuvre at low speed because of its twin propellers and single rudder
configuration. This, combined with the strong ebb tide and fresh water outflow
in the river at the time of departure, resulted in there being insufficient water
flow over its rudder to enable the pilot to manoeuvre the ship as he intended.
In addition, the master did not inform the pilot that the crew would be using the
ship’s engines independently during turns in the river. This resulted in the pilot
being concerned that his orders were being countermanded because he saw
that the engine telegraph levers were not as he had ordered. Following the
grounding, the pilot successfully manoeuvred the ship back into the channel
and the ship departed the port without further incident. There was no damage
to the ship and no pollution resulted. The report identifies a number of safety
issues and acknowledges the safety actions which have been taken by Club
Cruise International and the Tasmanian Ports Corporation to address them.
http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2008/mair/pdf/mair
252_001.pdf
At 1900 on 26 February 2004, the Bahamas registered passenger ship Astor
let go its mooring lines and departed the Queensland port of Townsville. The
ship, equipped with twin rudders, controllable pitch main propellers and a
single bow thruster, did not require a tug for the departure. The master, as is
common practice on passenger ships, manoeuvred the ship clear of the berth
and then, even though this was his first visit to Townsville, kept the conduct of
the ship without consulting the harbour pilot. The pilot adopted an advisory
role. As the ship was turning from the harbour into Platypus Channel, part of
the approach channel to the port, it grounded on its port side. The ship heeled
three degrees to starboard and, after about three minutes, slid clear of the
bank without assistance and continued out of the channel.

15

M.V. Monarch
of the Seas

8819500

Norway

Det Norske
Veritas

Grounding

http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2004/mair/mair200.
aspx
At approximately 0030 hours on the night of 15 December 1998, the passenger
vessel MONARCH OF THE SEAS arrived outside of Great Bay, St. Maarten
in order to evacuate a sick passenger to a shore side medical facility. At 0125
the vessel’s crew completed the passenger evacuation evolution and the
MONARCH OF THE SEAS departed St. Maarten, taking a SouthSoutheasterly departure route with the intention of safely passing to the east
of the Proselyte reef obstruction. At approximately 0130 hours the MONARCH
OF THE SEAS raked the Proselyte Reef at an approximate speed of about 12
knots without becoming permanently stranded. Almost immediately
emergency and abandon ship signals were sounded and the crew and
passengers were mustered at their abandon ship stations. At 0235 the vessel
was intentionally grounded on a sandbar in Great Bay, St. Maarten. By 0515
hours all 2,557 passengers were safely evacuated ashore by shore based
tender vessels.
http://marinecasualty.com/documents/monarch.pdf
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Appendix 2: SEMOMAP code book
SEMOMAP Draft Codebook
1. Overview of SEMOMAP
SEMOMAP is a primarily sequential accident investigation model developed for the maritime
industry. The original framework, developed by Schröder (2003) as a part of his PhD thesis, is
shown below:

yes

Dangerous
situation

Dangerous situation

Technical
failure

Human
failure

no

Situation
assessmt.

Beginning accident

yes

Organisational
failure

Failure
detection
no

Initial
response

no

yes
yes

System
recovered

Near miss

no

System
assessment

Further
data
input

Preparation of
evacuation

Calling for
external support

Emergency
response actions

Safe shipboard operational status

yes

Accident

System
recovery
possible

no

Abandon ship

yes

no

Stop
evacuation

Release external
support

Monitoring
system recovery

System
recovered

Evacuation

External
support
Emergency
delay
Total loss

Mitigated loss

Fig. 1 – The ‘Original’ SEMOMAP model
The idea behind this original model was that an accident can be depicted via a series of
sequential steps and crucial phases. Building on this idea, a revamped SEMOMAP model –
SEMOMAP v2 – was developed, as shown in Fig. 2 on the following page.
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Fig. 2 – The revamped SEMOMAP model – SEMOMAP v2

Before beginning the analysis of an accident through SEMOMAP, some general data needs to
be collated. The taxonomy of the information that needs to be gathered is provided in section
2; it consists of fields such as the ship name, IMO Number, and type and severity of incident.
The information collected via this taxonomy can allow users to compare how accidents differ
(if at all), based on factors such as type of ship, type of incident, and ship size. If the right data
and information is available, users can also do further analyses – such a comparing the safety
records of ships classified by different class societies or that of ships having different flag
states.
Having collected some basic background information, one can then use the SEMOMAP model.
The ‘new’ SEMOMAP v2 consists of 4 different phases. The ‘first’ phase is called ‘Phase 0’. This
phase identifies all the ‘Contributory Factors’ that contributed indirectly in a way that led to a
risk of an accident happening – but did not contribute to the accident itself. In other words,
the factors described in this phase led to the creation of a dangerous situation, but did not
directly cause any consequences per se. The taxonomy for ‘Phase 0’ is adapted from HFACS –
the Human Factors Analysis & Classification System, and was originally used for a paper
published by Schröder-Hinrichs, et al. (2011) titled ‘Accident investigation reporting
deficiencies related to organizational factors in machinery space fires and explosions’. The
taxonomy for phase 0 is presented in section 3 of this codebook. A person using SEMOMAP
identifies various subjects (human and technical) from the accident report, and then using the
HFACS taxonomy, describes factors that influenced that subject and contributed to the
creation of a dangerous situation.
If the factors mentioned in ‘Phase 0’ are resolved in time, the vessel can return to normal
operation; if this is not the case however, the accident progresses to the next 3 phases of
SEMOMAP. The second, third, and fourth phases of SEMOMAP are called ‘Phase 1’, ‘Phase 2’,
and ‘Phase 3’ respectively.
‘Phase 1’ is the ‘Beginning Accident’ phase. At this point, the subjects in the system – and by
extension, the system itself – have been affected by the factors identified in ‘Phase 0’. This
means that the system is facing an imminent risk of an incident, but still, the accident itself
has not come to pass. ‘Phase 1’ could indicate, for example, a vessel turning on to collision or
grounding route due to some factors as identified in ‘Phase 0’ – but would not cover the
collision or grounding itself. At this stage then, there is still a possibility to avoid the accident
through correct threat indication, detection, analysis, and correct threat prevention action. If
the correct steps are followed, the vessel can return to safe operations, with the incident
classed as a ‘near-miss’.
If however, the situation remains unchanged, the timeline moves into ‘Phase 2’ – i.e. – ‘The
Accident’ phase. As the name implies, this phase starts the moment the vessel experiences an
accident. At this stage, there is a possibility to prevent the accident from escalating any
further, through appropriate system health indication, detection, analysis, and appropriate
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emergency response measures. If the appropriate measures are undertaken, depending on
the severity, the vessel can either suffer a ‘mitigated loss’ or a ‘severe loss’. Mitigated loss
would indicate that the vessel has suffered damage, but can port unassisted; a severe loss
indicates a large enough damage that the ship cannot port unassisted.
If, by the end of Phase 2, the damage is not contained, it is possible that the situation escalates
further into the very last, critical phase – ‘Phase 3’ – a.k.a. – ‘Evacuation’. In this phase, as the
name implies, the best course of action is to evacuate and abandon the vessel. However,
emergency response measures may also continue to fight for increased evacuation time. In
this phase the priority is on the emergency and evacuations actions; system health indication,
detection and analysis may also continue to monitor the developments.
All 3 latter phases – Phases 1, 2, and 3 – have 4 types of steps: an ‘indication’ step, a ‘detection’
step, an ‘analysis’ step, and an ‘action’ step. These steps and their ‘common’ taxonomies are
discussed further in section 4. Each step has multiple ‘levels’ of information that can be filled
in, to provide more details that describe the accident. The taxonomies of these ‘levels’ are also
discussed in section 4.

The four types of steps, as shown
for ‘Phase 2’ of SEMOMAP

Fig. 3 – The steps of SEMOMAP
The reader may also note that it is possible to ‘loop around’ or have ‘iterations’, as shown in
Fig. 2. In each ‘loop’ or ‘iteration’ there can only be one (or none) ‘indication’, ‘detection’, and
‘analysis’ – but more than one ‘action’ is possible. Each phase, can of course, have multiple
iterations. It is also possible for an iteration to change the actual type of accident, or risk of
accident that a vessel faces.
This is because maritime accidents can be very complex, and a risk or an accident of one type
can quickly evolve into another type. In fact, according to Vassalos (2009), the following
possible links are possible between different types of accidents:
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Fig. 4 – Possible accident evolutions. Source: Vassalos (2009)
2. Taxonomy for General Information
Taxonomy Category
IMO Number
Vessel Name
Vessel type

Vessel Flag State
Classification Society
Keel Laid Year
Built at
Deadweight Ton (DWT)
Ship Length Over All (m)
Ship Beam (m)
Ship Loaded Draft (m)
Ship Height (m)
Date of Occurrence
Time of Occurrence
Geographical Occurrence
Location
Type of Occurrence

Number of Fatalities /
Injuries
Consequence to the Ship
Narratives

Description
State the IMO number of the ship
State ship name and its previous name
Classify the type of ship by its functionality to carry its
cargo: GC, Container, Bulk Carrier, Tanker, Passenger, RoRo, Others
State ship flag at the time of the accident
State the class society the ship was classified under at the
time of the accident
State the keel laid year as indicated in ship certificate
State the location (shipyard, country) the ship built
DWT of the ship
Overall length of the ship
State ship breadth
State the ship draft at the time of the occurrence
state the vertical measure of ship bottom to the upmost
deck
State date of occurrence
State time of occurrence by Local time and GMT
State the location of the occurrence by its fix gps position
and other geographical reference
Classify nature of accident with following event: Collision,
Grounding, Contact, Fire/explosion, Hull failure, Loss of
control, Ship/equipment damage, Capsize/listing,
Flooding/foundering, Ship Missing, Occupational accident,
Others, Unknown
State number of the fatalities as a result of the accident at
the point and subsequent fatality,
Provide sufficient information of the end consequences to
the ship due to accident,
Brief overview of the occurrence
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3. Taxonomy for Phase 0
As mentioned earlier, the taxonomy for Phase 0 was adapted from HFACS. This section
breaks down the HFACS taxonomy, and provides descriptions of what each option. The
taxonomy used for SEMOMAP consists of 4 levels; for brevity, however, the taxonomy
definitions provided in the codebook are only for levels 1, 2 and 3.

Organisational
Influence
Resource
Management

Organisational
Climate

Organisational
Process

Statutory factor

Failed to Correct
Known Problems

Supervisory
Violations

Supervision

Inadequate
Supervision

Planned Inappropriate
Operations

Preconditions

Environmental
Factors

Crew Condition

Personnel Factors

Unsafe Acts

Erro rs

Viol atio ns
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Level-1 Taxonomy
Terminology Definition
Organisational factors in a mishap if the communications, actions, omissions or
Influence policies of upper-level management directly or indirectly affect
supervisory practices, conditions or actions of the operator(s) and
result in system failure, human error or an unsafe situation
Supervision a mishap event can often be traced back to the supervisory chain of
command.
Pre-Condition factors in a mishap if active and/or latent preconditions such as
conditions of the operators, environmental or personnel factors affect
practices, conditions or actions of individuals and result in human error
or an unsafe situation
Unsafe Acts
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Level-2 Taxonomy
Taxonomy under Organisational influence
Organisational
Influence
Resource
Management

Parent Level
Organisational
Influence

Organisational
Climate

Organisational
Process

L-2 Terminology
Resource
Management

Statutory factor

Definition
factor in a mishap if resource management and/or
acquisition processes or policies, directly or
indirectly, influence system safety and results in poor
error management or creates an unsafe situation
Organisational
Factor in a mishap if organizational variables
Climate
including environment, structure, policies, and
culture influence individual actions and results in
human error or an unsafe situation.
Organisational
Factor in a mishap if organizational processes such as
Process
operations, procedures, operational risk
management and oversight negatively influence
individual, supervisory, and/or organizational
performance and results in unrecognized hazards
and/or uncontrolled risk and leads to human error or
an unsafe situation
Statutory factors Considered as external factor that mostly on the
policy and regulatory side
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Taxonomy under supervision
Supervision

Inadequate
Supervision

Parent Level
Supervision

Failed to Correct
Known Problems

Planned Inappropriate
Operations

L-2 Terminology
Inadequate
supervision

Planned
inappropriate
operation

Failure in
correct known
problem

Supervisory
violation

Supervisory
Violations

Definition
factor in a mishap when supervision proves
inappropriate or improper and fails to identify a
hazard, recognize and control risk, provide guidance,
training and/or oversight and results in human error
or an unsafe situation
factor in a mishap when supervision fails to
adequately assess the hazards associated with an
operation and allows for unnecessary risk. It is also a
factor when supervision allows non-proficient or
inexperienced personnel to attempt missions beyond
their capability or when crew or flight makeup is
inappropriate for the task or mission.
factor in a mishap when supervision fails to correct
known deficiencies in documents, processes or
procedures, or fails to correct inappropriate or
unsafe actions of individuals, and this lack of
supervisory action creates an unsafe situation.
factor in a mishap when supervision, while managing
organizational assets, wilfully disregards instructions,
guidance, rules, or operating instructions and this
lack of supervisory responsibility creates an unsafe
situation.
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Taxonomy under Precondition
Preconditions

Environmental
Factors

Parent Level
Pre Condition

Terminology
Condition of
Individual

Environmental
Factor
Personal Factor

Crew Condition

Personnel Factors

Definition
Factors in a mishap if cognitive, psycho-behavioural,
adverse physical state, or physical/mental limitations
affect practices, conditions or actions of individuals
and result in human error or an unsafe situation.
factors in a mishap if physical or technological factors
affect practices, conditions and actions of individual
and result in human error or an unsafe situation
factors in a mishap if self-imposed stressors or crew
resource management affects practices, conditions
or actions of individuals, and result in human error or
an unsafe situation
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Taxonomy under Unsafe Acts
Unsafe Acts

Erro rs

Parent Level
Unsafe Acts

Terminology
Errors

Violations

Viol atio ns

Definition
Factors in a mishap when mental or physical activities
of the operator fail to achieve their intended
outcome as a result of skill-based, perceptual, or
judgment and decision making errors, leading to an
unsafe situation
Factors in a mishap when the actions of the operator
represent wilful disregard for rules and instructions
and lead to an unsafe situation. Unlike errors,
violations are deliberate.
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Level-3 Taxonomy
Taxonomy under Resource Management (under Organisational Influence)
Resource
Management

Poor Equipment/
Facility Resources
 Inadequate safe
manning
 Selection
 Training

Parent Level
Resource
Management

Poor Technological
Resources

Poor Equipment/
Facility Resources

 Excessive cost cutting
 Financial resources/
support

 Engineer support
 Acquisition policies/
design process
 Attrition policies
 Accession/ selection
policies
 Poor engine-room
design
 Poor engine-room
machinery design
 Purchasing of
unsuitable equipment
 Failure to correct
known design flaws
 Shortage of tools

Terminology
Lack of human
resource
Poor technological
resources

Poor
equipment/facility

Definition
Issues that directly influence safety include
selection (including background checks),
training, and staffing/manning
Are factors in a mishap when ship design
factors or automation affect the actions of
individuals and result in human error or an
unsafe situation
issues related to equipment design, including
the purchasing of unsuitable equipment,
inadequate design of workspaces, and failures
to correct known design flaws
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Taxonomy under Organisational Climate (under Organisational Influence)
Org anisati onal
Climate

Disor gani sed Str uct ur e

Policies

 Chain-of-command
 Communication
 Accessibil ity/ visibilit y
of supervi sor
 Del egation of
aut hor ity/ rigidity
 Formal accountabil ity
for actions

 Promot ion
 Hiring, firing and
retention
 Drugs and alcohol
 Accident and incident
investigation

Parent Level
organizational
climate

L-3: Terminology
Disorganised
Structure

Inadequate
Policies

Poor Work
Culture

Poor Wor k Culture

 Norms and rules
 Organisat ional
customs, beliefs and
at titudes
 Safety as a value

Definition
a factor when the chain of command of an
individual or structure of an organization is
confusing, non-standard or inadequate and this
creates an unsafe situation
A course or method of action that guides present
and future decisions. Policies may refer to hiring
and firing, promotion, retention, raises, sick leave,
drugs and alcohol, overtime, accident
investigations, use of safety, equipment, etc. When
these policies are ill-defined, adversarial, or
conflicting, safety may be reduced
a factor when explicit/implicit actions, statements
or attitudes of unit leadership set
unit/organizational values (culture) that allow an
environment where unsafe mission demands or
pressures exist
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Taxonomy under Organisational Process (under Organisational Influence)
Org anisati onal
Pro cess

Poorly Desi gned
Operat ion

 Operat ional tempo/
workload
 Incentives
 Time pressure
 Schedules

Parent Level
Organisational
Process

L-3: Terminology
Poorly designed
operation

Inappropriate
procedures

Lack of oversight

Inappropriat e
Procedur es
 Per for mance
standards
 Clearl y defi ned
objectives
 Procedur al guidance/
publicat ions
 Informational
resour ces/ suppor t

Lack of Oversight

 Doctrine
 Established safety
progr ammes/ risk
management
progr ammes
 Monitoring and
checking of
resour ces, climate
and pr ocesses to
ensure safe wor k
environment

Definition
a factor when the potential risks of a large program,
operation, acquisition or process are not adequately
assessed and this inadequacy leads to an unsafe
situation.
a factor when written direction, checklists, graphic
depictions, tables, charts or other published
guidance is inadequate, misleading or inappropriate
and this creates an unsafe situation
a factor when programs are implemented without
sufficient support, oversight or planning and this
leads to an unsafe situation
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Taxonomy under Statutory Factor (under Organisational Influence)
Statuto ry factor

Poor International/
Nat ional Standar ds

Inadequate Flag State
Implement ation
 Link with vessel/
company
 Del egation of
aut hor ity to RO
 Class and statutory
surveys
 Communication

 Rule-making process
 Regulations

Parent Level
Statutory
factor

L-3: Terminology
Poor
international/national
standards
Inadequate flag state
implementation

Definition
national or international standards that led to poor
conditions and a dangerous situation
the flag state procedures were inadequate and led
to a dangerous situation
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Taxonomy under Inadequate Supervision (under Supervision)
Inadeq uate S upervision

 Poor Shipborne and

Shore Supervision

 Leadershi p/ supervisi on/ oversight
inadequate
 Supervision - modelling
 Local trai ni ng issues/ progr ammes
 Supervision - policy
 Supervision - personality conflict
 Supervision - lack of feedback
 Failed to provide current public/ adequate
technical dat a or pr ocedures
 Failed to provide adequate rest period
 Lack of accountabili ty
 Per ceived lack of aut hor ity
 Failed to track quali fi cations
 Failed to track performance
 Over-tasked/ untrained officer at
management level
 Loss of supervisor y situati onal awareness
 Lack of communication with company
representat ives

Parent Level
Inadequate
supervision

L-3: Terminology
Poor shipborne
and shore
supervision

Definition
a factor when the availability, competency, quality or
timeliness of leadership, supervision or oversight does
not meet task demands and creates an unsafe situation
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Taxonomy under Planned Inappropriate Operations (under Supervision)
Planned Inappropriate Operations

 Poor Shipborne Operat ions










Ordered/ led maintenance beyond capability
Poor crew inter action
Limited r ecent experi ence
Limited t ot al experi ence
Proficiency
Lack of risk assessment - formal
Author ised unnecessary hazard
Failed to provide adequate brief time /
supervisi on
 Failed to provide adequate opportunity for crew
rest
 Excessi ve tasking/ loadi ng

Parent Level
Planned
inappropriate
operations

L-3: Terminology
Poor shipborne
operations

Definition
a factor in a mishap when supervision fails to
adequately assess the hazards associated with an
operation and allows for unnecessary risk
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Taxonomy under Failed to Correct Problems (under Supervision)
Failed to Corr ect Known Proble ms

 Shipborne Related Shortcomings

 Failed to correct inappr opr iate/ risky
behaviour
 Failed to correct a safety hazard
 Failed to initiate corrective action
 Failed to report unsafe tendencies
 Failed to update manual
 Par ts / tools incorrectly labeled

Parent Level
Failed to
correct known
problems

L-3: Terminology
Shipborne related
shortcomings

Definition
a factor when the supervisor selects an individual
who’s experience for either a specific manoeuvre,
event or scenario is not sufficiently current to permit
safe mission execution.
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Taxonomy under Supervisory Violations (under Supervision)
Sup erviso ry Viola tion s

 Shipborne Violations







Parent Level
Supervisory
violations

Engaged unqual ified crew
Failed to enforce rules/ regs
Viol ated procedures
Wil lful disr egard of aut hor ity
Inadequate documentati on

L-3: Terminology
Shipborne
violations

Definition
Violations on board the ship that led to the creation of
a dangerous situation
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Taxonomy under Environmental Factors (under Preconditions)
Environ me nta l Facto rs

Poor Physical Envir onment

Poor Technological Environment






















 Temperature - thermal stress
 Ar tificial light
 Vibr ation
 Ship movements and manoeuvres
 Toxins and cleanliness in machiner y
space
 Noise i nter ference

Parent Level
Environmental
factors

L-3: Terminology
Poor physical
environmental

Poor
technological
environment

Controls and switches
Automati on
Machinery space layout
Communication equi pment
Barriers
Faulty equipment
Const rained tool use
Complex faul t
Inaccessible maintenance area
Machinery space configuration variabi lity
Par ts unavai lable
Par ts i ncor rect ly labeled
Easy to instal l incorrectly
Machinery space system knowledge
Procedur e not under standable
Procedur e unavailable/ inaccessibl e
Incorr ect pr ocedure
Too much/ conflicting information
Process/ procedur e update not carried out
Incorr ectly modified manufacturer's
procedur es

Definition
Physical environment are factors in a mishap if
environmental phenomena such as weather, climate,
white-out or dust-out conditions affect the actions of
individuals and result in human error or an unsafe
situation
Technological environment are factors in a mishap
when cockpit/vehicle/workspace design factors or
automation affect the actions of individuals and result
in human error or an unsafe situation

120

Taxonomy under Crew Condition (under Preconditions)
Crew Cond itio n

Negative Cognitive Factors




























Poor Physiological State

 Effects of PoM and OTC (Medicinal
Drugs)
 Operat ional inj ur y/ illness
 Sudden incapacitation/
unconsciousness
 Physical fatigue
 Seasickness
 Hypoxia
 Hyperventilat ion
 Dehydr ation
 Physical t ask oversaturation
 Intoxication
 Nutrit ion
 Inadequate r est
 Unreported disqualified medical
condition
 Overexcertion while off duty
 Misplaced moti vation
 Inadequate mot ivati on
 Pre-exist ing physical illness/ injury/
defi ci ent
 Motor skill/ coordinat ion or timing
defi ci ent
 Insufficient reaction time

Inattention, repet itive and monotonous
Channelised at tenti on
Confusion
Distracti on
Checklist interfer ence
Emotional st ate
Per sonality styl e
Overconfidence
Pressing
Complacency
Overagressive
Excessi ve motivation to succeed
Get-there-itis
Response set
Burnout
Fatigue - mental
Circadian r hythm desynchrony
Misper ception of oper ational condition
Misinterpreted/ mi sr ead instr ument
Expectancy
Auditor y cues
Other cues
Al ert ness (drowsi ness)
Peer pr essur e
Technical/ procedur al knowledge
Negative transfer

Parent Level
Crew
condition

L-3: Terminology
Negative
cognitive factors

Poor physiological
state

Definition
Are factors in a mishap if cognitive or attention
management conditions affect the perception or
performance of individuals and result inhuman error or
an unsafe situation
Are factors when an individual’s personality traits,
psychosocial problems, psychological disorders or
inappropriate motivation creates an unsafe situation
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Taxonomy under Personnel Factors (under Preconditions)
Per son nel Fa ctors

Poor Crew Interact ion

Poor Per sonal Readiness






 Machinery space leadership
 Cross-monit or ing
performance
 Team work delegation
 Rank gradient/ power distance
 Asser tiveness
 Communicating criti cal
information
 Chall enge and reply
 Mai nt enance plan
 Mai nt enance plan briefing
 Task-in-progr ess re- planning
 Miscommuni cation

Parent Level
Personnel
factors

L-3: Terminology
Poor crew
interaction

Poor personal
readiness

Inadequate t raining
Mai nt enance task knowledge
Time constr aints
Patt ern of poor r isk judgment

Definition
Refer to interactions among individuals, crews, and
teams involved with the preparation and
execution of a mission that resulted in human error or
an unsafe situation
factors in a mishap if the operator demonstrates
disregard for rules and instructions that govern the
individuals readiness to perform, or exhibits poor
judgment when it comes to readiness and results in
human error or an unsafe situation
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Taxonomy under Errors (under Unsafe Acts)
Errors

Decisio n a nd judgemen t
erro rs

Skill-based erro rs














Parent Level
Errors

Inadver tent use of
equi pment , control and
swit ches
Task overloadFail ur e t o
see and avoid
Distracti on
Poor techniques/
seamanshipOver/
under-control of the
system
Over-reliance on
aut omati on
Negative habit
Checklist error
Omitted step in
procedur e
Procedur es not used
Failed to priorit ise
at tenti on









L-3: Terminology
Skilled based
errors

Decision and
judgement errors

Perceptual errors

Risk assessment during
oper ation
Task mi spri or itisati on
Necessary action –
rushed
Necessary action –
delayed
Warning i gnored
Wr ong deci sion maki ng
during operation

Per cep tua l er rors





Error due to
mi sperception
Error due to misj udged
par ameters

Definition
Are factors in a mishap when errors occur in the
operator’s execution of a routine, highly
practiced task relating to procedure, training or
proficiency and result in an unsafe a situation
Are factors in a mishap when behaviour or actions of
the individual proceed as intended yet the
chosen plan proves inadequate to achieve the desired
end-state and results in an unsafe situation
Are factors in a mishap when misperception of an
object, threat or situation, (such as visual,
auditory, pro prioceptive, or vestibular illusions,
cognitive or attention failures, etc), results in
human error
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Taxonomy under Violations (under Unsafe Acts)
Violations

Routine










Parent Level
Violations

Exceptional




Viol ation based on risk
assessment
Inadequate br iefing for job
Operat ed when
unauthori sed
Viol ated training rul es
Failed to comply wit h
manuals
Viol ated st anding or ders
and r egs
Failed to inspect after
al arm

L-3: Terminology
Routine

Exceptional




Exceeded l imits of system
Accepted unnecessar y
hazards
Not qual ified
Unauthori sed to operate
beyond design cr iter ia

Definition
a factor when a procedure or policy violation is
systemic in a unit/setting and not based on a risk
assessment for a specific situation. It needlessly
commits the individual, team, or crew to an unsafe
course-of-action. These violations may have leadership
sanction and may not routinely result in
disciplinary/administrative action. Habitual violations
of a single individual or small group of individuals
within a unit can constitute a routine/widespread
violation if the violation was not routinely disciplined or
was condoned by supervisors
a factor when an individual, crew or team intentionally
violates procedures or policies without cause or need.
These violations are unusual or isolated to specific
individuals rather than larger groups. There is no
evidence of these violations being condoned by
leadership
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‘Taxonomy of Subjects Affected by Contributory Factors
It was mentioned earlier that it is important to identify the subjects that are influenced by
the contributory factors. Following is a tabulated list of subjects. Note that this list is by no
means exhaustible. Each of the subjects is self-explanatory.
Category of Subject
Human Subjects

Sub-Category
Captain & Officers

Navigators
Other Crew

Engineers

Technical Subjects

Bridge & Deck

Engine Room

Ship Structure &
Design
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Subject
Captain
1st/Chief Officer
2nd Officer
3rd Officer
Other Officer
Helmsman
Pilot
AB
Bosun
OS
1st/Chief Engineer
2nd Engineer
Other Engineer
Steering Equipment
Navigation Aids (AIS, ECDIS, Radar,
GPS, etc…)
Communication Equipment
Alarm Panels & System
Main Engine
Auxiliary Engine
Engine Control Panel
Fuel Pumps
Ballast Water Pumps
Generators
Boilers
Hull
Separators

4. Taxonomy for Phases 1 – 3
Phases 1, 2 and 3, as mentioned earlier, each consist of 4 types of steps. At each step,
several levels of information can be filled in – in a given order. The section details the order
in which information is filled in, and provides taxonomies for each of the 4 different steps.
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L2

Which specific threat indicator, based on the dangerous scenrio, did not function?

L1

L3B

Information Recording Successful? If not:

Information Transmission Successful? If
not:

L3A

Information Recording Applicable?

Information Transmission Applicable?

Threat Indication

Phase 1 - Beginning Accident

Human Failure - Specify

Equipment Failure - Specify

Human Failure - Specify

Equipment Failure - Specify

No Threat Information Transmitted
Unclear Threat Information Transmitted
Partial Threat Information Transmitted
Wrong Threat Information Transmitted
Delay in Threat Information Transmitted
Unnecessary Threat Information Transmitted

No Threat Information Recorded
Unclear Threat Information Recorded
Partial Threat Information Recorded
Wrong Threat Information Recorded
Delay in Threat Information Recorded
Unnecessary Threat Information Recorded
No Threat Information Transmitted
Unclear Threat Information Transmitted
Partial Threat Information Transmitted
Wrong Threat Information Transmitted
Delay in Threat Information Transmitted
Unnecessary Threat Information Transmitted

No Threat Information Recorded
Unclear Threat Information Recorded
Partial Threat Information Recorded
Wrong Threat Information Recorded
Delay in Threat Information Recorded
Unnecessary Threat Information Recorded

Mis-hear, mis-see, mis-read threat; ignore threat; late detection of threat; forget to
monitor for threat; forget to share information of threat; omitted action

Choose a problem based on chosen Auto. System - e.g. not installed, turned off, wrong
settings, electric failure, poor maintenance record, out-of-date technology, loose
connections, unreliable software

Mis-hear, mis-see, mis-read threat; ignore threat; late detection of threat; forget to
monitor for threat; forget to share information of threat; omitted action

Choose a problem based on chosen hardware - e.g. not installed, turned off, wrong
settings, electric failure, poor maintenance record, out-of-date technology, loose
connections, unreliable software

This phase covers how an accident could have been avoided altogether, despite the imminent risk of a dangerous situation
L4A
L4B
L5

As shown in the figure on the previous page, filling in a SEMOMAP step during any phase
consists of up to 7 stages (shown in black circles, numbered 1 to 7).
1. Determine the Phase
The phases have been discussed previously in Section 1. It is possible to be in Phase 0, 1, 2 or
3. This section deals exclusively with Phases 1, 2 and 3.
2. Determine the Step (Indication, Detection, Analysis or Action) – Level 1
If they are in Phase 1, the steps will be [Threat] Indication, [Threat] Detection, [Threat]
Analysis, and [Threat Prevention] Action
In Phase 2, the steps will be [System Health] Indication, [System Health] Detection, [System
Health] Analysis, and [Emergency Response] Action
In Phase 3, the steps will be [Emergency Response & Evacuation] Action, [System Health]
Indication,
[System
Health]
Detection,
and
[System
Health]
Analysis
The steps are self-explanatory. An ‘Indication’ step is one where something may be indicated
by someone or something. A ‘detection’ step is where the indication from an indicator may be
detected by someone or something. In the ‘analysis’ step, someone or something may
performs an analysis on what is detected in the previous step. In the ‘action’ step, an action
may be taken based on the ‘analysis’ step. It is important to note that any of these steps, it is
possible that nothing is done at all.
3. Choose a Subject – Level 2
Depending on stages 1 and 2, as well as the type of risk, or type of accident that the vessel
faces, the users must choose a subject at this stage that was used for a particular step in a
particular phase, for a particular type of accident. The type of accident (navigation, on-board,
entire-vessel constitutes ‘Level 2A’).
The tables on the following pages show the possible subjects for the various phases, steps,
and types of incidents.
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Possible subjects for Phase 1 under navigational incidents (collision, contact, grounding)
L2B

L2C

L2D

L2E
Radar
Echo Sounder
AIS

Equipment

ECDIS
Sea Charts
GPS

Onboard

Other
Lookout

Threat Indication

OOW
Human

Other Crew
Member
Passenger
Other
Foghorn
Lighthouse

Equipment
Ashore

Bouy/Navigation
al Aid
Other
VTS

Human

Coastguard
Other

Threat Detection

L2B

L2C

L2D
Equipment

Onboard
Human
Ashore

Human

L2E
Decision Support
System
Other
Master
OOW
Other
VTS
Other
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Threat Analysis

L2B

L2C

Equipment
Onboard
Human
Ashore

Threat Prevention Action

L2B

L2D

L2C

Human

L2D

Onboard

Action

Offboard

Action

L2E
Decision Support
System
Other
Master
OOW
Other
VTS
Other
L2E
Steering & Manouvering
Altering Speed
Dropping Anchor
Reverse Thrust
Other
Other Vessel Alters
Course
Other Vessel Alters
Speed
Other
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Possible subjects for Phase 1 under on-board incidents (fire, explosion, structural failure,
engine failure, loss of control, equipment damage)
L2B

L2C

L2D

Threat Indication

Equipment
Onboard
Human

Equipment
Ashore
Human

Threat Detection

L2B

L2C

L2D
Equipment

Onboard
Human
Ashore

Human

L2E
Fire Alarm System
Heat Detector
Smoke Detector
CCTV & Cameras
Other
Lookout
OOW/EOW
Other Crew Member
Passenger
Other
Fleet Monitoring
System
Other
Fleet Monitoring
Centre
Other
L2E
Decision Support System
Other
Master
OOW/EOW
Other
Fleet Monitoring Centre
Other
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L2B

L2C

L2D

L2E

Equipment

Threat Analysis

Onboard
Human

Equipment
Ashore
Human

Threat Prevention Action

L2B

L2C

Onboard

Decision Support
System
Other
Master
OOW
Other
Fleet Monitoring
System
Other
Fleet Monitoring
Centre
Other

L2D

L2E

Action

Cut off oxygen supply to
flammable area
Close fire doors
Move flammable goods
to safe place
Reduce heat
Shut down engine
Shut down affected
systems
Other
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Possible subjects for Phase 1 under entire-vessel incidents (Capsize, Listing, Flooding,
Foundering)
L2B

L2C

L2D

Threat Indication

Equipment
Onboard
Human

Equipment
Ashore
Human

L2B

L2C

Threat Detection

Onboard
Human
Equipment
Ashore
Human

L2C

L2E
Decision Support System
Other
Master
OOW
Other
Fleet Monitoring System
Other
Fleet Monitoring Centre
Other

L2D
Equipment

Threat Analysis

Alarms & Warning
Stability Indicators
Water Level Indicators
CCTV & Cameras
Other
Lookout
OOW
Other Crew Member
Passenger
Other
Fleet Monitoring System
Other
Fleet Monitoring Centre
Other

L2D
Equipment

L2B

L2E

Onboard
Human
Equipment
Ashore
Human

L2E
Decision Support System
Other
Master
OOW
Other
Fleet Monitoring System
Other
Fleet Monitoring Centre
Other
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L2B

L2C

Threat
Prevention action

Onboard

L2D

Action

L2E
Altering Speed
Stabilize & Secure Cargo
Seal Hull Compartments
Other

134

Possible Subjects for Phase 2 under navigational incidents (collision, contact, grounding)

System Health Indication

L2B

L2C

L2D

Equipment
Onboard
Human

Equipment
Ashore
Human

System Health Detection

L2B

System Health Analysis

L2B

L2C

L2D
Equipment

Onboard
Human
Equipment
Ashore
Human

L2C

L2D
Equipment

Onboard
Human
Equipment
Ashore
Human

L2E
Hull Damage Sensors
List Indicators
Water Level Indicators
Stability Indicators
Other
OOW
Other Crew Member
Passenger
Other
Fleet Monitoring System
Other
Fleet Monitoring Centre
Other
L2E
Decision Support System
Other
Master
OOW
Other
Fleet Monitoring System
Other
Fleet Monitoring Centre
Other
L2E
Decision Support System
Other
Master
OOW
Other
Fleet Monitoring System
Other
Fleet Monitoring Centre
Other
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Emergency Response
Action

L2B

L2C

L2D

Onboard

Action

Offboard

Action

L2E
Contain Hull Damage
Contain Equipment
Damage
Drop Anchor
Reverse Thrust
Other
Tug Vessel
Other
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Possible subjects for Phase 2 under on-board incidents (fire, explosion, structural failure,
engine failure, loss of control, equipment damage)
L2B

L2C

L2D

System Health Indication

Equipment
Onboard
Human

Equipment
Ashore
Human

System Health
Detection

L2B

System Health Analysis

L2B

L2C

L2D
Equipment

Onboard
Human
Ashore

Human

L2C

L2D
Equipment

Onboard
Human
Equipment
Ashore
Human

L2E
Fire Alarm System
Heat Detector
Smoke Detector
CCTV & Cameras
Other
Lookout
OOW/EOW
Other Crew Member
Passenger
Other
Fleet Monitoring System
Other
Fleet Monitoring Centre
Other
L2E
Decision Support System
Other
Master
OOW
Other
Fleet Monitoring Centre
Other
L2E
Decision Support System
Other
Master
OOW
Other
Fleet Monitoring System
Other
Fleet Monitoring Centre
Other
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Emergency Response Action

L2B

L2C

L2D

Onboard

Action

Offboard

Action

L2E
Fire-fighting
Sprinkler System
Muster Crew
Move flammable goods to
safe place
Cut off oxygen supply to
flammable area
Close fire doors
Shut down engine
Shut down affected
systems
Other
Fire-fighting vessel
Other
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Possible subjects for Phase 2 under entire-vessel incidents (Capsize, Listing, Flooding,
Foundering)
L2B

L2C

L2D

System Health Indication

Equipment
Onboard
Human

Equipment
Ashore
Human

System Health Detection

L2B

System Health Analysis

L2B

L2C

L2D
Equipment

Onboard
Human
Equipment
Ashore
Human

L2C

L2D
Equipment

Onboard
Human
Equipment
Ashore
Human

L2E
Alarms & Warning
Stability Indicators
Water Level Indicators
CCTV & Cameras
Other
Lookout
OOW
Other Crew Member
Passenger
Other
Fleet Monitoring System
Other
Fleet Monitoring Centre
Other
L2E
Decision Support System
Other
Master
OOW
Other
Fleet Monitoring System
Other
Fleet Monitoring Centre
Other
L2E
Decision Support System
Other
Master
OOW
Other
Fleet Monitoring System
Other
Fleet Monitoring Centre
Other
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Emergency Response
Action

L2B

L2C

L2D

Onboard

Action

Ashore

Action

L2E
Altering Speed
Stabilize & Secure Cargo
Seal Hull Compartments
Seal Watertight
Compartments
Ballast Water Stabilisation
Other
Tug Vessel
Other
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Possible Subjects for Phase 3 under navigational incidents (collision, contact, grounding)

Emergency Response & Evacuation

L2B

System Health Indication

L2B

L2C

L2D

Onboard

Action

Offboard

Action

L2C

L2D

Equipment
Onboard
Human

Equipment
Ashore
Human

-L2E
Contain Hull Damage
Contain Equipment
Damage
Drop Anchor
Reverse Thrust
Lower Lifeboats
Lower MES/Liferafts
Muster Personnel
Other Emergency
Response Measure
Other Evacuation
Measure
Call Tug Vessel
Call SAR Services
Other
L2E
Hull Damage Sensors
List Indicators
Water Level Indicators
Stability Indicators
Other
OOW
Other Crew Member
Passenger
Other
Fleet Monitoring System
Other
Fleet Monitoring Centre
Other
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System Health Detection

L2B

System Health Analysis

L2B

L2C

L2D
Equipment

Onboard
Human
Equipment
Ashore
Human

L2C

L2D
Equipment

Onboard
Human
Equipment
Ashore
Human

L2E
Decision Support System
Other
Master
OOW
Other
Fleet Monitoring System
Other
Fleet Monitoring Centre
Other
L2E
Decision Support System
Other
Master
OOW
Other
Fleet Monitoring System
Other
Fleet Monitoring Centre
Other

142

Possible subjects for Phase 3 under on-board incidents (fire, explosion, structural failure,
engine failure, loss of control, equipment damage)

Emergency Response & Evacuation

L2B

L2B

L2C

L2D

Onboard

Action

Offboard

Action

L2C

L2D

System Health Indication

Equipment

Onboard
Human

Equipment
Ashore
Human

L2E
Fire-fighting
Sprinkler System
Muster Crew
Move flammable goods
to safe place
Cut off oxygen supply to
flammable area
Close fire doors
Shut down engine
Shut down affected
systems
Lower Lifeboats
Lower MES/Liferafts
Muster Personnel
Other Emergency
Response Measure
Other Evacuation
Measure
Call Fire-fighting vessel
Call SAR Services
Other
L2E
Fire Alarm System
Heat Detector
Smoke Detector
CCTV & Cameras
Other
Lookout
OOW/EOW
Other Crew
Member
Passenger
Other
Fleet Monitoring
System
Other
Fleet Monitoring
Centre
Other
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System Health Detection

L2B

L2B

L2C

L2D
Equipment

Onboard
Human

Ashore

Human

L2C

L2D

System Health Analysis

Equipment
Onboard
Human

Equipment
Ashore
Human

L2E
Decision Support
System
Other
Master
OOW
Other
Fleet Monitoring
Centre
Other
L2E
Decision Support
System
Other
Master
OOW
Other
Fleet Monitoring
System
Other
Fleet Monitoring
Centre
Other
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Possible subjects for Phase 3 under entire-vessel incidents (Capsize, Listing, Flooding,
Foundering)

Emergency Response & Evacuation

L2B

L2B

L2C

L2D

Onboard

Action

Ashore

Action

L2C

L2D

System Health Indication

Equipment
Onboard
Human

Equipment
Ashore
Human

L2E
Altering Speed
Stabilize & Secure Cargo
Seal Hull Compartments
Seal Watertight
Compartments
Ballast Water
Stabilisation
Lower Lifeboats
Lower MES/Liferafts
Muster Personnel
Other Emergency
Response Measure
Other Evacuation
Measure
Call Tug Vessel
Call SAR Services
Other
L2E
Alarms & Warning
Stability Indicators
Water Level Indicators
CCTV & Cameras
Other
Lookout
OOW
Other Crew Member
Passenger
Other
Fleet Monitoring System
Other
Fleet Monitoring Centre
Other

145

System Health Detection

L2B

System Health Analysis

L2B

L2C

L2D
Equipment

Onboard
Human
Equipment
Ashore
Human

L2C

L2D
Equipment

Onboard
Human
Equipment
Ashore
Human

L2E
Decision Support
System
Other
Master
OOW
Other
Fleet Monitoring System
Other
Fleet Monitoring Centre
Other
L2E
Decision Support
System
Other
Master
OOW
Other
Fleet Monitoring System
Other
Fleet Monitoring Centre
Other
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4. Specify whether the step was Applicable and Successful – Level 3A & 3B
This stage firstly breaks down each step into smaller ‘sub-steps’, as follows:
Step
Indication
Detection

Analysis

Action

Sub-Steps
Information Recording
Information Transmission
Information Receiving
Information Evaluation
Information Transmission
Information Receiving
Planning
Decision Making
Communication
Timing & Sequence
Selection & Quality

Once again, these steps and sub-steps are self-explanatory.
At this stage, the user must determine whether each sub-step was applicable or not. If it was
not applicable (for instance, if the threat indicator and detector are the same person and there
is therefore no transmission or receiving or information; or if there was no threat detection)
the user does not need to answer any more questions, and can move to the next sub-step or
step. Alternatively, if a sub-step was applicable, and successful, in that case too, the user can
move to the next sub-step without going into further stages of the sub-step.
If, however, a sub-step is applicable, and unsuccessful, the user must answer further
questions, and moves to stage 5.
Note here that successful means success in the context of the sub-step – and not in the context
of the entire accident or incident; a successful action might still be a wrong action in terms of
the accident, but it was ‘successful’ because in itself, it was done correctly, but may, for
example, have been based on wrong information from the previous step.
5. Specify whether Human or Equipment Failure – Level 4A
If a sub-step was unsuccessful, the user can select in this stage if it was due to human or
equipment failure.
6. Specify what the Human or Equipment Failure Was – Level 4B
In this level, the user gets to specify what the exact human or equipment failure was. It
depends on the sub-step, and the phase that the user is in. Tables on the following pages show
the possible failures for each possible sub-step as defined in earlier on this page. This
taxonomy is adapted from the TRACEr taxonomy of Kirwan and Shorrock (2002).
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Possible Failures for Information Recording
No Information Recorded
Unclear Information Recorded
Partial Information Recorded
Wrong Information Recorded
Delay in Information Recorded
Unnecessary Information Recorded
Possible Failures for Information Transmission
No Information Transmitted
Unclear Information Transmitted
Partial Information Transmitted
Wrong Information Transmitted
Delay in Information Transmitted
Unnecessary Information Transmitted
Possible Failures for Information Receiving
No Information Received
Unclear Information Received
Partial Information Received
Wrong Information Received
Delay in Information Received
Unnecessary Information Received

Possible Failures for Information Evaluation
No Evaluation
Unclear Evaluation
Partial Evaluation
Incorrect Evaluation
Delayed Evaluation
Possible Failures for Planning
No Planning
Unclear Planning
Partial Planning
Wrong Planning
Delay in Planning
Unnecessary Planning
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Possible Failures for Decision Making
No Decision
Unclear Decision
Partial Decision
Wrong Decision
Delay in Decision
Possible Failures for Communication
No Action Information Provided/Recorded
Unclear Action Information Provided/Recorded
Partial Action Information Provided/Recorded
Wrong Action Information Provided/Recorded
Delay in Action Information Provided/Recorded
Unnecessary Action Information
Provided/Recorded
Possible Failures for Timing & Sequence
Action too long
Action too short
Action too early
Action too late
Action repeated
Action in wrong sequence
Possible Failures for Selection & Quality
Omission
Action too much
Action too little
Action in wrong direction
Wrong action on right object
Right action on wrong object
Wrong action on wrong object
Extraneous act
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7. Specify why the failure occurred – Level 5
In this level, the user gets to specify why the human or equipment made an error or failed. It
depends solely on whether a human or technical subject committed a failure, regardless of
the phase or the step. The taxonomy for this stage too (at least for the human subjects) is
adapted from TRACEr (Kirwan, Shorrock 2002).
The following tables show possible internal error modes for human subjects.
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The following tables show the possible respective psychological error modes, also for human
subjects.
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With regards to equipment failures, there is no ‘taxonomy’ per se. However, it is broadly been
identified that an equipment may cause a failure if it is not installed, if it is turned off, is on the
wrong settings, suffers from an electric failure, has a poor maintenance record, is out-dated
technology, has loose connections or unreliable software. Some of these errors too can be
traced back to human mistakes, but primarily may be considered ‘equipment’ failure causes.
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